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Abstract
New relaxations of the Nash equilibrium concept are shown to exist in any strategic game with
discontinuous payoff functions. The new concepts are used (1) to show the equivalence between Reny’s
better-reply security condition [28] and Simon-Zame’s endogenous tie-breaking rule equilibrium concept
[32], (2) to obtain conditions for the existence of approximated equilibria in a class of discontinuous
games that naturally extends Reny’s better-reply secure games, and (3) to show the existence of
approximated equilibria in a large family of two-player games that contains all standard models of
auctions.
JEL classification: C02, C62, C72.
Keywords: Discontinuous games, better-reply security, sharing-rule equilibrium, approximated
equilibrium, strategic approximation, auctions, diagonal games.
1 Introduction
Many economic interactions can be formulated as games with discontinuous payoff functions. Examples
include price and spatial competition, auctions, bargaining problems, preemption games, wars of attrition,
general equilibrium models, etc.
To study the existence of a Nash equilibrium in these games, standard results such as the Nash-
Glicksberg’s theorem [16, 25, 26] fail because they require continuous utility functions. As a result, two
kinds of issues were explored in the literature.
The first issue is to identify some regularity conditions on payoffs, which combined with a limited
form of quasiconcavity of utility functions, guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium. The first
conditions of existence are given by the seminal papers of Dasgupta and Maskin [12, 13]. The significant
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breakthrough, extending the previous results, is achieved by Reny [28] throughout the better-reply security
condition.
Quoting Reny, “A game is better-reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x∗ and every payoff
vector limit u∗ resulting from strategies approaching x∗, some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff
strictly above u∗i even if the others deviate slightly from x
∗”. In particular, many examples above are
better-reply secure and consequently admit a Nash equilibrium. Reny’s paper induces a large and still
extremely active research agenda. For instance, Barelli and Soza [3, 5] and Mclennan et al. [24] propose an
extension to non-transitive preferences and non-quasiconcave games, Reny [29, 30] introduces a refinement
of better-reply security, Carmona [9] gives an extension of Dasgupta and Maskin’s results, which are
unrelated to Reny’s approach. More recently, Barelli et al. [4] apply Reny’s tools to prove the existence
of the value (and so existence for an ε-Nash equilibrium for every ε > 0) in a large class of zero-sum
games including the Colonel Blotto game.
The second issue is to propose an alternative solution concept for games without a Nash equilibrium.
Simon and Zame [32] argue that “payoffs should be viewed as only partially determined, and that when-
ever the economic nature of the problem leads to indeterminacies, the sharing rule should be determined
endogenously.” Actually, in most applications, discontinuities are located on a low-dimensional subspace
of strategy profiles (firms or players choosing the same price, location, bid, acting time, etc.). In some of
these games, the exogenously given tie-breaking rule leads to no pure Nash equilibrium (e.g. asymmetric
Bertrand duopoly, Hotelling location game) or no mixed Nash equilibrium (e.g. 3-player timing games
[22], auctions with correlated types or values [15, 18]). However, the existence of a Nash equilibrium
is restored if the tie-breaking rule is chosen endogenously [21, 23, 32]. For instance, in an asymmetric
Bertrand duopoly, a pure Nash equilibrium exists if ties are broken in favor of the lower-cost firm. Simon
and Zame give a significant answer by proving, under mild topological conditions on the strategy spaces,
the existence of a solution (i.e. a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies after an eventual modification of
payoff functions at discontinuity points).
Another alternative solution for games without a Nash equilibrium is the notion of approximated
equilibrium. An approximated equilibrium is a limit strategy profile x∗ and a limit payoff vector u∗ of
ε-Nash equilibria xε with associated payoff vector u(xε), as ε goes to 0. It was shown to exist in many
games such as two-player stochastic and timing games [22, 34, 35] and more recently for the Colonel Blotto
game [4]. Surprisingly, there is but only one general result in the spirit of Nash’s theorem which provides
the existence of approximated equilibria, due to Prokopovych [27]. While theoretically interesting, it
requires assumptions on payoff functions that are not applicable in many economic problems (such as
auctions).
The main objective of our paper is (1) to establish a connection between better-reply security, endoge-
nous sharing rule and approximated equilibrium, in pure and mixed strategies and (2) to extend Reny,
Simon and Zame’s ideas (usually used to study existence of a Nash equilibrium) to study existence of an
approximated equilibrium.
A first result is the “equivalence” between Reny and Simon-Zame approaches in pure strategies. This
answers to a question of Jackson and Swinkel [19], who ask if “these approaches [Reny and Simon-Zame]
turn out to be related”.1 This equivalence requires the extension of Simon and Zame’s solution to pure
1De Castro [11] proposes an answer to the question of Jackson et al. [17] in a restricted class of games.
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strategies, since the Simon and Zame solution concept is only defined and proved to exist in mixed
strategies. This leads us to the concept of sharing-rule equilibrium, which induces a Nash equilibrium
whenever the game is better-reply secure.
The existence of a sharing-rule equilibrium in any quasiconcave game without any topological as-
sumptions on the payoff functions is a second result of our paper. This answers another open question in
Jackson et al. [17], who, after extending Simon and Zame’s solution to game with incomplete information,
remark that their “results concern only the existence of solutions in mixed strategies and that they “have
little to say about the existence of solutions in pure strategies”. Technically, the proof of existence of a
sharing-rule equilibrium is a direct consequence of Reny’s [28] existence result.
A third contribution is an equivalence result similar to the previous one, in mixed strategies. This
requires the introduction of the finite deviation equilibrium concept. We link it to the useful idea of
strategic approximation recently studied by Reny [30].
The last important contribution concerns approximated equilibria. Actually, the existence of a
sharing-rule equilibrium in any quasiconcave compact game leads naturally to a new class of games in
which an approximated equilibrium always exists. These are games satisfying the following weaker form
of better-reply security: for every non-approximated equilibrium (x∗, u∗), some player i has a strategy
yielding a payoff strictly above u∗i even if the others deviate slightly from x
∗.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline the main approaches of the literature
(Reny [28], Simon-Zame [32] and Prokopovych [27]). In Section 3, we unify Reny and Simon-Zame in
pure strategy games by introducing Reny and sharing-rule equilibrium concepts. Section 4 is devoted to
the existence of approximated equilibria in pure strategies. In Section 5, we consider the mixed strategy
case. We introduce the finite deviation equilibrium concept and use it (1) to unify Reny and Simon-
Zame, (2) to show the existence of a strategic approximation in a large class of games, and (3) to provide
conditions for the existence of approximated equilibria in mixed strategies. In Section 6, we refine Reny’s
equilibrium (in pure strategies) in three different directions. One of them concerns the non-quasiconcave
case, which is illustrated with Hotelling’s location game. Another is related to the recent extension of
Reny by Barelli and Soza [5]. The last extension proves a general existence result which refines and
implies many recent extensions of Reny’s better-reply security condition [3, 5, 9, 10, 28, 29]. Importantly,
the proof of this extension is almost standard since based on a classical fixed theorem combined with a
new selection lemma. The last section (appendix) provides the most technical proofs.
To illustrate the results, a general class of two-player games (diagonal games) is introduced in Sec-
tion 4 (in pure strategies and complete information) and Section 5 (in mixed strategies with incomplete
information). It includes almost all known models of competitions, in particular Bertrand, location, bar-
gaining, Cournot with capacities, auctions and timing games, among others. As a byproduct, we show the
existence of an approximated mixed equilibrium in any two-player auction with incomplete information.
Recall that such games may have no Nash equilibrium, as shown in [15, 18]. For instance, in a first price
auction with complete information, the rational behavior is for the player with the highest evaluation
to bid slightly above the second highest evaluation, which provides an approximated equilibrium. This
paper proves that the existence of an approximated equilibrium is indeed guaranteed in a large class of
two-player auction games.
3
2 Three Approaches to Discontinuous Games
A game in strategic form G = ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) is given by a finite set N of players, and for each player
i, a set Xi of pure strategies and a payoff function ui : X =
∏
i∈N Xi → R. This paper assumes G to be
compact: for every i ∈ N , Xi is a compact subset of a topological vector space and ui is bounded.2
Definition: x ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium if for every i ∈ N , Vi(x−i) := supdi∈Xi ui(di, x−i) ≤
ui(x),
where x−i = (xj)j 6=i. A game G is quasiconcave if for every i, Xi is convex and for every x−i ∈ X−i :=
Πj 6=iXj , the mapping ui(·, x−i) is quasiconcave. The game is continuous if for every i, ui is continuous3.
Nash-Glicksberg’s theorem (in pure strategies): any continuous, quasiconcave and
compact game G admits a Nash equilibrium.
The rest of the section presents three different extensions of this result. Our paper links them into
one general idea.
2.1 Better-Reply Security
In many discontinuous games, a Nash equilibrium exists (Bertrand price competition, auctions, location
games, concession games, wars of attrition among many). Reny’s theorem [28] provides an explanation
for this.
Formally, let Γ = {(x, u(x)) : x ∈ X} denote the graph of G and Γ be the closure of Γ. Since G is
compact, Γ is compact as well. Define the “secure payoff level” of player i when he plays di and when
the other players play x−i as follows:
ui(di, x−i) = lim inf
x′−i→x−i
ui(di, x
′
−i).
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This is the payoff that player i can almost guarantee by playing di, if the other players are allowed to
deviate slightly from x−i.
Definition: G is better-reply secure if whenever (x, v) ∈ Γ and x is not a Nash equilibrium,
some player i ∈ N can secure5 a payoff strictly above vi, i.e. there exists di ∈ Xi such that
ui(di, x−i) > vi.
It is easy to verify that any continuous game is better-reply secure.
Reny’s theorem [28]: any better-reply secure, quasiconcave and compact game admits a
Nash equilibrium.
2Some results require the strategy sets to be metric and/or Hausdorff.
3X is endowed with the product topology.
4The notation lim inf
x′−i→x−i
could be misleading since the strategy spaces are not necessarily metric: con-
vergence should be understood in the sense of nets. A topological definition of lim inf is the following:
lim inf
x′−i→x−i
ui(di, x
′
−i) = sup
V ∈V(x−i)
inf
x′−i∈V
ui(di, x
′
−i), where V(x−i) denotes the set of neighborhoods of x−i.
5Player i can secure a payoff above α ∈ R if there exists di ∈ Xi and a neighborhood V−i of x−i such that for every
x′−i ∈ V−i, ui(di, x′−i) ≥ α.
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In his paper, Reny gives two useful sufficient conditions under which a game is better-reply secure:
payoff security and reciprocal upper semicontinuity.
Definition: (i) G is reciprocally upper semicontinuous if, whenever (x, v) ∈ Γ and u(x) ≤ v,
then u(x) = v. (ii) G is payoff secure6 at x−i ∈ X−i if Vi(x−i) = Vi(x−i), where Vi(x−i) :=
supdi∈Xi ui(di, x−i).
2.2 Approximated Equilibrium
A natural relaxation of Nash equilibrium is the following.
Definition: (x, v) ∈ Γ is an approximated equilibrium if there exists a sequence7 (xn)n∈N of
X such that:
(i) for every n ∈ N∗, xn is a 1n -equilibrium, that is: for every player i ∈ N and every deviation
di ∈ Xi, ui(di, xn−i) ≤ ui(xn) + 1n .
(ii) the sequence (xn, u(xn)) converges to (x, v).
Several classes of games do not have a Nash equilibrium but do admit an approximated equilibrium
(two-player undiscounted stochastic games [34, 35], two-player timing games [22], among others). How-
ever, in the literature, few topological conditions for the existence of an approximated equilibrium exist.
This subsection describes such a result. One of the main objectives of our paper is to extend this theorem
using Reny’s better-reply security idea and apply it to a large class of two-player games.
Definition: a game G has the marginal continuity property if Vi is continuous for every i.
Prokopovych’s theorem [27]: any payoff secure, quasiconcave and compact game that has
the marginal continuity property admits an approximated equilibrium.
A continuous game is payoff secure and has the marginal continuity property. Moreover, continuity
insures that approximated and Nash equilibria coincide. Consequently, Prokopovych’s theorem is an
extension of Nash-Glicksberg’s theorem. First-price auction (with complete information) and asymmetric
Bertrand’s competition do not have a Nash equilibrium but have an approximated equilibrium (see
example 3). They are payoff secure and have the marginal continuity property. However, the following
known location game [32] is not payoff secure, but does have an approximated equilibrium. Our extension
of Prokopovych’s theorem applies to this example (see Section 3).
Example 1. The length interval [0, 4] represents an interstate highway. The strategy set of player
1 (a psychologist from California) is X = [0, 3] (representing the Californian highway stretch). The
strategy set of player 2 (a psychologist from Oregon) is Y = [3, 4] (the Oregon part of the highway). The
payoff function of player 1 is u1(x, y) =
x+y
2 if x < y and u1(3, 3) = 2. The payoff function of player
2 is u2(x, y) = 4 − u1(x, y). The strategy profile xn = (3 − 1n , 3), corresponding to the vector payoff
vn = (3 − 12n , 1 + 12n ), is a 12n -equilibrium. Consequently, (x = (3, 3), v = (3, 1)) is an approximated
equilibrium. However, the game is not payoff secure for player 2 at x = (3, 3).
6Actually, Reny defines a game G to be payoff secure if for every x ∈ X, for every ε > 0, every player i ∈ N can secure
a payoff above ui(x)− ε. we can check that this implies Vi(x−i) = Vi(x−i) for every x ∈ X, the converse being not true.
7Again, the definition is stated in terms of sequences, while we should use convergence in the sense of nets.
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2.3 Endogenous Tie-Breaking Rule
The California location game above is introduced by Simon and Zame [32] to illustrate their equilibrium
notion. They propose to change slightly the game by exhibiting an alternative tie-breaking rule at
discontinuity points so that the auxiliary game admits a Nash equilibrium.
Example 2. (California location game, continued) The California location game, defined above,
is constant-sum, discontinuous and has no Nash equilibrium. Define a new payoff function q as follows:
q(x) = u(x) for every x 6= (3, 3) and q(3, 3) = (3, 1). The pure strategy profile (3, 3) is a Nash equilibrium
of the game defined by q. The new sharing rule at x = (3, 3) has a simple interpretation: it corresponds
to giving each psychologist his/her natural market share.
Simon and Zame do not assume the game to be quasiconcave, but allow the use of mixed strategies.
Formally, G is metric if strategy sets are Hausdorff and metrizable and payoff functions are measurable.
Denote by Mi = ∆(Xi) the set of Borel probability measures on Xi (usually called the set of mixed
strategies of player i). This is a compact Hausdorff metrizable set under the weak* topology. Let
M = ΠiMi. A mixed Nash equilibrium of G is a (pure) Nash equilibrium of its mixed extension G
′ =
((Mi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ), where payoff functions are extended multi-linearly to M .
Definition: A couple (σ, q) is a solution (call it a sharing-rule mixed equilibrium) of G if
σ ∈ M is a mixed equilibrium of the auxiliary game G˜ = ((Xi)i∈N , (qi)i∈N ), where the
auxiliary payoff functions q = (qi)i∈N must satisfy:8
(SR): ∀y ∈ X, q(y) ∈ coΓy,
where, Γx = {v ∈ RN : (x, v) ∈ Γ} is the x-section of Γ.
Condition (SR) has two implications that justify the term sharing rule: if u is continuous at x,
q(x) = u(x); if
∑
i∈N
ui(x) is continuous then
∑
i∈N
qi(x) =
∑
i∈N
ui(x).
Simon and Zame’s theorem [32]: any metric and compact game admits a sharing-rule
mixed equilibrium.
Again, this is an extension of the Nash-Glicksberg’s theorem in mixed strategies: when the game is
continuous, the auxiliary and the original games coincide. In that case, the theorem states that:
Nash-Glicksberg’s theorem (in mixed): any continuous, metric and compact game ad-
mits a mixed Nash equilibrium.
Jackson et al. [17] extend Simon and Zame’s theorem to games with incomplete information. In
their paper, they interpret a tie-breaking rule as a proxy for the outcome of an unmodeled second stage
game. As example, they recall the analysis of first-price auctions with incomplete information for a single
indivisible object. Maskin and Riley [23] add to the sealed-bid stage a second stage where bidders with the
highest bid in the first stage play a Vickrey auction. In the private value setting, their dominant strategy
8Where co stands for the convex hull.
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is to bid their true values. Consequently, the second stage induces a tie-breaking rule where the bidder
with the highest value wins the object. More generally, a tie-breaking rule may be implemented by asking
players to send a cheap message (their private values in auctions), in addition to their strategies (bids).
The messages will be used only to break ties (as in the second stage of Maskin and Riley’s mechanism).
3 Sharing-Rule Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
As explained in the introduction, the relation between Simon-Zame and Reny’s existence results is an
important open question. The aim of this section is to give a formal equivalence between these two
results in pure strategies, the mixed-strategy case being treated in Section 5. The link with approximated
equilibrium and in particular with Prokopovych’s theorem is presented in the next section.
Example 3. In a Bertrand duopoly, two firms i = 1, 2 choose prices pi ∈ [0, a] (a > 0). Assume a linear
demand a −min(p1, p2) and marginal costs c1 < c2 < a+c12 . The game has no pure Nash equilibrium if
we assume that the firm charging the lowest price supplies the entire market. Nevertheless, the game is
quasiconcave and compact. This game has a solution a` la Simon-Zame, with a strategy profile (c2, c2)
and with payoff function q(c2, c2) = ((a − c2)(c2 − c1), 0), while q(x) = u(x) elsewhere. This seems to
be the intuitive solution of the game and it may be related to another standard tool to circumvent the
non-existence of a Nash equilibrium: just assume a smallest monetary unit δ > 0. Then, the strat-
egy profile (c2 − δ, c2) is a Nash equilibrium of this discretized game. The associated payoff vector is
((c2 − δ − c1)(a− c2 + δ), 0). As δ goes to zero, we obtain the Simon-Zame’s solution.
Several remarks are of interest. Both examples (California location and Bertrand’s duopoly) yield a
solution (a` la Simon and Zame) in pure strategies, yet Simon-Zame equilibrium notion is defined in mixed
strategies. Second, the solution happens to be an approximated equilibrium in both cases (in example
2, consider the sequence of 12n -Nash equilibria (3 − 1n , 3), and in example 3, the sequence (c2 − 1n , c2)).
Third, both games are not better-reply secure, because they are quasiconcave, compact, but have no
Nash equilibrium.
The next definition extends Simon-Zame’s solution to games in pure strategies.
Definition 1 (x, v) ∈ Γ is a sharing-rule equilibrium if x is a (pure) Nash equilibrium of an auxiliary
game G˜ = ((Xi)i∈N , (qi)i∈N ), where:
(i) v = q(x) is the associated vector payoff.
(ii) For every y ∈ X, q(y) ∈ Γy.
(iii) For every i ∈ N and every di ∈ Xi, qi(di, x−i) ≥ ui(di, x−i).
In other words, a sharing-rule equilibrium is a pure strategy profile x and a payoff vector v such
that x is a classical Nash equilibrium of an auxiliary game G˜ and v is the associated payoff vector at
x. Without conditions on G˜, any strategy profile could be made a Nash equilibrium of some auxiliary
game. To reduce the number of solutions, the new game must be as close as possible to the original game.
Condition (ii) says that q(y) is a limit point of some u(yn) as yn goes to y. Consequently, only payoffs
at discontinuity points of u are modified. Hence it is similar to condition (SR) in Simon and Zame, but
no convex hull is required. Condition (iii) asks the payoff function of a player in the auxiliary game to
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remain above the security payoff level in the original game. This is not required by Simon and Zame.
The following example shows its importance.
Example 4. Consider a one-player game who maximizes over [0, 1] the following discontinuous payoff
function: u(x) = 0 if x < 1, and u(1) = 1. The rational solution is clearly the profile x = 1 yielding the
highest possible payoff. But the constant payoff function q = 0 satisfies Condition (ii) above. So, any
mixed strategy profile σ is a solution a` la Simon-Zame. Condition (iii) implies that the unique possible
auxiliary payoff function is q = u, and the only equilibrium strategy of the auxiliary game is x = 1.
More generally, in a one-player game, the upper semicontinuous regularization of u, defined by
uu.s.c.(x) = lim sup
x′→x
u(x′), satisfies (ii) and (iii). Thus, if x maximizes uu.s.c., then (x, uu.s.c.(x)) is a
sharing-rule equilibrium. For two players or more, the payoff profile q = (uu.s.c.i )i∈N may not satisfy (ii)
or even (SR). Examples are easy to construct.
To link sharing-rule equilibrium with Reny’s better-reply security and prove its existence, we introduce
the following new equilibrium concept.
Definition 2 (x, v) ∈ Γ is a Reny equilibrium if
∀i ∈ N, Vi(x−i) := sup
di∈Xi
ui(di, x−i) ≤ vi.
Theorem 1. Any quasiconcave and compact game G admits a Reny equilibrium.
Existence is a straightforward consequence of Reny’s [28] theorem. Indeed, assume, by contradiction,
that there is no Reny equilibrium. This implies that the game is better-reply secure. Consequently, from
Reny [28], there exists a Nash equilibrium, which is obviously a Reny equilibrium: a contradiction.
Theorem 2. Any quasiconcave and compact game G admits a sharing-rule equilibrium.
Let us prove Theorem 2. From Theorem 1, there exists a Reny equilibrium (x, v) ∈ Γ. Then, we
can build the sharing-rule equilibrium as follows. For every i ∈ N and di ∈ Xi, denote by S(di, x−i)
the space of sequences (xn−i)n∈N of X−i converging to x−i such that limn→+∞ ui(di, x
n
−i) = ui(di, x−i).
Then, define q : X → RN by
q(y) =

v if y = x,
any limit point of (u(di, x
n
−i))n∈IN if y = (di, x−i) for some i ∈ N, di 6= xi, (xn−i)n∈N ∈ S(di, x−i),
q(y) = u(y) otherwise.
Now, let us prove that x is a sharing-rule equilibrium profile associated to q. Since (x, v) ∈ Γ, and
by definition of q, condition (ii) of Definition 1 is satisfied at x. Obviously, it is satisfied at every y
different from x for at least two components, and also at every (di, x−i) with di 6= xi, from the def-
inition of q(di, x−i) in this case. To prove condition (iii) of Definition 1, let i ∈ N and di ∈ Xi. If
di = xi then qi(di, x−i) = qi(x) = vi ≥ ui(x) because (x, v) is a Reny equilibrium. If di 6= xi then
qi(di, x−i) = ui(di, x−i) so that condition (iii) holds. The proof is complete.
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The following proposition links Reny, Nash, approximated and sharing-rule equilibria.
Proposition 3
i) Reny and sharing-rule equilibria coincide.
ii) If x ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium, (x, u(x)) is a Reny equilibrium.
iii) If (x, v) ∈ Γ is an approximated equilibrium, (x, v) is a Reny equilibrium.
iv) A game is better-reply secure if and only if Nash and Reny equilibria coincide.
Proof. Part i) is a consequence of the last proof and the definition of a sharing-rule equilibrium. For ii),
if x ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium, then ui(x) ≥ ui(di, x−i) ≥ ui(di, x−i) for every player i ∈ N and every
deviation di ∈ Xi. For iii), if (x, v) ∈ Γ is an approximated equilibrium, let (xn)n∈N be a sequence of
1
n -equilibria such that (x
n, u(xn)) converges to (x, v). By definition, ui(di, x
n
−i) ≤ ui(xn) + 1n for every
n ∈ N, for every player i ∈ N and every deviation di ∈ Xi. Passing to the infimum limit when n tends
to infinity, we obtain ui(di, x−i) ≤ vi. To finish, iv) is a straightforward consequence of the definitions of
Reny equilibrium and better-reply security.
Thus, the Reny equilibrium has an appealing interpretation as a sharing rule and constitutes a neces-
sary condition for a profile to constitute a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the notion of a Reny equilibrium
may be used to simplify some proofs in the literature. To illustrate this, let us prove that a payoff
secure and reciprocally upper semicontinuous game is better-reply secure: if (x, v) is a Reny equilib-
rium, then sup
di∈Xi
ui(di, x−i) ≤ vi for every player i ∈ N . Since the game is payoff secure, we obtain
sup
di∈Xi
ui(di, x−i) ≤ vi. Taking d = x, we deduce that u(x) ≤ v. Since the game is reciprocally upper
semicontinuous, v = u(x). Consequently, x is a Nash equilibrium.
The next section uses Reny equilibria (or equivalently sharing-rule equilibria) to establish conditions
for existence of approximated equilibria in quasiconcave compact games and explains why in Bertrand
duopoly (and many similar games), sharing-rule equilibria and approximated equilibria coincide.
4 Approximately Better-Reply Secure Games
The previous section shows that a game is better-reply secure if and only if Nash and Reny equilibria
coincide. Following this idea, introduce the following class of games.
Definition 4 G is approximately better-reply secure if Reny and approximated equilibria coincide. Equiv-
alently, if whenever (x, v) ∈ Γ is not an approximated equilibrium, then there exists a player i ∈ N and
di ∈ Xi such that ui(di, x−i) > vi.
This is a natural relaxation of Reny’s definition. Existence of a Reny equilibrium implies:
Theorem 3. Any approximately better-reply secure, quasiconcave and compact game admits an approx-
imated equilibrium.
The following example of Dasgupta and Maskin [13] illustrates the result.
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Example 5. There are two players, X1 = X2 = [0, 1] and the payoff functions are defined as follows:
ui(x1, x2) =
{
0 if x1 = x2 = 1,
xi otherwise.
No pure Nash equilibrium exists. However, the game is approximately better-reply secure: (x =
(1, 1), v = (1, 1)) is the unique Reny and approximated equilibrium. It is, in our opinion, the intuitive
solution of the game.
Let us give two applications. The first encompasses Prokopovych’s theorem and California location
game, the second implies the existence of an approximated equilibrium in a general class of two-player
games.
Proposition 5 Let G be a quasiconcave and compact game G where:
(i) The function Vi(x−i) is continuous.
(ii) If x ∈ X is not a Nash equilibrium, some player i ∈ N can secure a payoff strictly above ui(x).
(iii) G is payoff secure except on a finite set of profiles.
Then G is approximately better-reply secure.
Proof. Let (x, v) be a Reny equilibrium. Remark that from (ii), if (x, u(x)) is a Reny equilibrium, then
x is a Nash equilibrium. Thus, if v = u(x), from (ii), x is a Nash equilibrium and so is an approximated
equilibrium. Suppose v 6= u(x). Consequently, there exists a sequence of distinct points (xn, u(xn))
converging to (x, v). From iii), supdi∈Xi ui(di, x
n
−i) = supdi∈Xi ui(di, x
n
−i) for n large enough, and from
i), the limit is supdi∈Xi ui(di, x−i). Consequently, (x, v) is an approximated equilibrium.
This implies Prokopovych’s theorem: if Vi(x−i) = Vi(x−i) is continuous, conditions i), ii) and iii) are
satisfied. The California location game does not satisfy Prokopovych’s assumptions (it is payoff secure
except at (3, 3)), but satisfies i), ii) and iii).
Consider now the following class of two-player games on the unit square.
Example 6. Let fi, gi and hi be three mappings from X = [0, 1]× [0, 1] to R, i = 1, 2. The payoff of
player i is
ui(xi, x−i) =

fi(xi, x−i) if x−i > xi,
gi(xi, x−i) if x−i < xi,
hi(xi, x−i) if x−i = xi.
Call such a model a diagonal game, denoted G = ((fi, gi, hi)i=1,2). It includes most two-player
models of competition with complete information such as: auctions, Bertrand games, spatial games,
Cournot games with capacities and timing games. The following proposition (proved in Appendix 8.1)
provides the existence of an approximated equilibrium for a large class of diagonal games.
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g1
f1
h1
x = 0 x = 1
y = 0
y = 1
f2
g2
h2
x = 0 x = 1
y = 0
y = 1
Figure 1: Representation of u1(x, y) and u2(x, y) in Example 6
Proposition 6 Any quasiconcave diagonal game satisfying (i) and (ii) below is approximately better-
reply secure, where:
(i) fi and gi are continuous, i = 1, 2.
(ii) hi(xi, xi) ∈ co{fi(xi, xi), gi(xi, xi)} for every (xi, xi) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1].
Suppose for instance that gi(., x−i) is non-increasing and fi(., x−i) is non-decreasing on [0, 1] (for every
x−i ∈ X−i and i = 1, 2): under Condition (ii) above, the diagonal game is quasiconcave, and Proposition
6 can be applied whenever f and g are continuous. This is to be compared with Example 3.1 in Reny [28],
where under similar conditions, a Nash equilibrium is proved to exist in the smaller class of timing games.
The following examples prove that without condition (i) or (ii) in Proposition 6, an approximated
equilibrium may fail to exist. When (ii) is not satisfied but h is supposed to be continuous, we can prove
that an approximated equilibrium still exists, using a refinement of Reny equilibrium (see Section 6.1).
When the game fails to be quasiconcave, existence of an approximated equilibrium must be studied in
mixed strategies (see next section).
Example 7. Consider the two-player game where the strategy spaces are X = Y = [0, 1], and the
payoff functions ui are defined below and illustrated in Figure 1:
0
0
1
x = 0 x = 1
y = 0
y = 1
1
0
2
1
x = 0 x = 1
y = 0
y = 1
Figure 1: Representation of u1(x, y) and u2(x, y) in Example 7
u1(x, y) =
{
0 if x 6= y
1 if x = y
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u2(x, y) =

2 if x < y
1 if x ≥ y and y 6= 1
0 if x = y = 1
This is a quasiconcave and compact diagonal game where condition (ii) of Proposition 6 is not satis-
fied. The game has no pure approximated equilibrium.
Importantly, continuity of f(x, y) only on the half space {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] : x < y} may not
guarantee the existence of an approximated equilibrium, as the following example shows.
Example 8. The following diagonal symmetric game is quasiconcave, compact and satisfies all
assumptions but i), since here, the mapping f(x, y) = xy has no continuous extension on [0, 1]× [0, 1].
u1(x, y) =

x
y if x < y
1
2 1x>0 if x = y
1
2 if x > y
u2(x, y) = u1(y, x)
The game has no approximated pure equilibrium: indeed, no player i will play 0 at an ε-equilibrium
(for ε < 12 ), since he would obtain 0, although he could guarantee 1/2 (playing 1 if the other player j plays
y = 0, and just below y if y > 0). Now, given a strategy x > 0 of player i, player j should play some y
just below x and get a payoff close to 1 while the other player obtains 12 . Consequently, no ε-equilibrium
exists for ε < 12 . We can check that (x = (0, 0), v = (
1
2 ,
1
2 )) is the unique Reny equilibrium, and is also a
1
2 -equilibrium.
Our last example proves that Prokopovych’s theorem cannot be applied to the class of diagonal games
covered by Proposition 6.
Example 9. Consider the two-player game where the strategy spaces are X = Y = [0, 1], and the
payoff functions ui are defined below:
u1(x, y) =

2 + x if x < y
1 if x = y
0 if x > y
u2(x, y) = y
This game satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 6. The only approximated equilibrium is (x =
(1, 1), v = (3, 1)) (which is, in our opinion, the natural solution of the game). However, Prokopovych’s
theorem cannot be applied, because V1(x2) = supd1∈[0,1] u1(d1, x2) is discontinuous at x2 = 0.
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5 Games in Mixed Strategies
In this section, we introduce the concept of finite mixed deviation equilibrium. This equilibrium notion
allows Reny and Simon-Zame results to be unified in mixed strategies and is applied to provide conditions
under which a game admits a strategic approximation.
The fundamental idea of strategic approximation reveals itself to be extremely powerful in showing
existence of Nash or approximated equilibrium, as will be seen in the framework of two-player diagonal
games and auctions with incomplete information.
5.1 Finite Mixed Deviation Equilibria
Throughout this section, G is a metric compact game, G′ denotes its mixed extension and Γ′ is the closure
of the graph of G′.
Definition 7 (m, v) ∈ Γ′ is a finite mixed deviation equilibrium if for every open set Vm,v that contains
(m, v) and every finite set Di ⊂ Mi, i = 1, ..., N , of mixed strategies, there exist finite sets D′i ⊂ Mi
containing Di (i = 1, ..., N) and m
′, a mixed Nash equilibrium of the game restricted to D′, such that
(m′, u(m′)) ∈ Vm,v.
Theorem 4. Any metric compact game G admits a finite mixed deviation equilibrium.
Proof. The proof uses a finite discretization of the game, and a limit argument: let D be the set of
all finite subsets Πi∈NDi of M . Consider the inclusion relationship on D (which is reflexive, transitive
and binary). Then, each pair Πi∈NDi and Πi∈ND′i in D has an upper bound Πi∈N (Di ∪D′i) in D. The
couple (D,⊂) is called a directed set. To every D = Πi∈NDi ∈ D, we can associate (mD, u(mD)), where
mD is a Nash mixed equilibrium of the finite game restricted to D. This defines a mapping from D to
Γ′, called a net (of Γ′). Then, a limit point (m, v) ∈ Γ′ of this net, denoted (mD, u(mD))D∈D, is defined
by the following property: for every neighborhood Vm,v of (m, v) and every D = Πi∈NDi ∈ D, there
exists D′ ∈ D with D ⊂ D′ such that (mD′ , u(mD′)) ∈ Vm,v. Such a limit point (m, v) exists due to
compactness of Γ′. Then (m, v) is clearly a finite mixed deviation equilibrium.
Similarly, if we require the deviations sets Di and D
′
i to be pure strategy sets in the definition of a finite
mixed deviation equilibrium, we shall say that (m, v) is a finite pure deviations equilibrium (F.P.D.E).
Its existence is proved similarly.
The concept of finite mixed deviation equilibrium is intuitive: it says that the mixed profile m with
associated payoff vector v is “almost” a usual Nash mixed equilibrium. The concept requires that for
any finite set of mixed deviations Di ⊂Mi, there is a profile m′, which is as close to m as desirable, with
a payoff u(m′) as close to v as desirable, such that m′ is a Nash in a finite game D′ larger than D.
Definition 8 G has the weak finite deviation property if finite mixed deviation equilibria and Nash equi-
libria coincide.
A first motivation for this definition is to encompass the following class of games introduced by Reny
[29], which generalizes better-reply security in mixed strategies as follows:
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Definition: G has the finite deviation property if whenever m∗ ∈M is not a Nash equilibrium
of G′, then there exists m1, ...,mK ∈M and a neighborhood U of m∗ such that for all m′ ∈ U
there is a player i and k such that ui(m
k
i ,m
′
−i) > ui(m
′).
Theorem 5.
i) Every metric compact game which has the weak finite deviation property admits a Nash equilibrium.
ii) For every mixed Nash equilibrium m of G′, (m,u(m)) is a finite mixed deviation equilibrium.
iii) G is better reply-secure ⇒ G has the finite deviation property ⇒ G has the weak finite deviation
property.
Proof. Property i) is a consequence of Theorem 4. To prove ii), let m be a mixed Nash equilibrium of
G′, V be an open neighborhood of (m,u(m)) and Di ⊂ Mi, i = 1, ..., N , be finite mixed strategy sets.
Then m is a Nash equilibrium of Πi∈N (Di∪{mi}), thus (m,u(m)) is a finite mixed deviation equilibrium.
Last, to prove the second implications of iii), assume G has the finite deviation property and m is not a
Nash, then there exists m1, ...,mK ∈M and a neighborhood U of m such that for all m′ there is a player
i and k such that ui(m
k
i ,m
′
−i) > ui(m
′). Let (m, v) ∈ Γ′ , let V be an open neighborhood of (m, v) such
that (m′, v) ∈ V implies m′ ∈ U : this proves that (m, v) is not a finite mixed deviation equilibrium. The
proof of the other statements is left to the reader.
The following theorem, proved in Appendix 8.2, shows that finite mixed deviation equilibrium unifies
Simon-Zame and Reny existence results and so answers affirmatively to Jackson and Swinkel’s question
[19]. Also, keeping in mind that a finite mixed deviation equilibrium is nothing more than a limit point of
Nash equilibria of a sequence of approximation of the game’s strategy space, Theorem 6 makes precise the
following idea in Reny [30]: “A rather distinct approach to approximating infinite games can be pursued
by exploiting the techniques introduced in Simon and Zame, where payoffs are sometimes redefined at
points of discontinuity.”
Theorem 6. Any finite mixed deviation equilibrium is a solution a` la Simon-Zame and is a Reny
equilibrium of the mixed extension of G.
The following example proves that finite mixed deviation equilibrium is a strict improvement of Reny
equilibrium and Simon-Zame’s solution.
Example 10. (California location game, continued). Let G = (X,Y, u1, u2) be the California
location game, and consider the following modification G˜ = (X,Y, u˜1, u˜2) of G: u˜1(x, y) = u1(x, y) if x
is rational, and u˜1(x, y) = 0 otherwise. Similarly, u˜2(x, y) = u2(x, y) if y is rational, and u˜2(x, y) = 0
otherwise. Then every completely mixed strategy profile is a Reny and a solution a` la Simon-Zame
(associated to the payoff 0). This game is not quasiconcave, and the mixed extension is not better reply
secure (because there is no Nash equilibrium). We now check that there is only one finite mixed deviation
equilibrium (m, v), for m = (3, 3) and v = (3, 1), and this corresponds to the unique approximated
equilibrium of this game. Indeed, for any finite discretization Dn1 and D
n
2 of X and Y , and V any
neighborhood of ((3, 1), (3, 1)), define D
′n
1 = D
n
1 ∪ {3− ε} and D
′n
2 = D
n
2 ∪ {3}. For ε > 0 small enough,
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(3 − ε, 3) is a mixed Nash equilibrium of the finite game restricted to D′n1 × D
′n
2 , with ((3 − ε, 3), (3 −
ε
2 , 1 +
ε
2 )) ∈ V .
5.2 Strategic Approximation
To understand the key idea of strategic approximation, we should come back to its origin. Simon and
Zame construct their solution by taking a limit point of Nash equilibria of a sequence of discretizations.
Dagsputa and Maskin [12] establish conditions under which limit points of Nash of any sequence of
discretizations by finite games is a Nash mixed equilibrium of G. Simon [31] relaxes the requirement
by establishing conditions under which any limit points of Nash of some sequence of discretizations by
finite games is a Nash mixed equilibrium of G. In particular, he proves that any payoff secure and
reciprocal upper semicontinuous compact and metric game in mixed strategies has this property. Reny
[30] provides weaker conditions (close to better-reply security) under which a strategic approximation
or a finite-support strategic approximation exist: here, a finite-support strategic approximation of G
(resp. strategic approximation of G) is a sequence of finite sets (Dni ⊂ Xi)i∈N of pure strategy (resp.
(Dni ⊂Mi)i∈N of mixed strategies) such that any limit point of Nash mixed equilibria of Gn = (Dni , ui)i∈N
is a Nash mixed equilibrium of G.
In the previous subsection, we have introduced finite mixed deviation equilibrium, which has several
usefull properties: it exists, is a Nash for general classes of games, and permits Reny and Simon-Zame
to be unified in mixed strategies. Thus, it is natural to try to extend the idea of strategic approximation
to this equilibrium notion. First note that from the proof of the existence of a finite mixed deviation
equilibrium m (Theorem 4) and the fact the Γ′ is compact and metric, there exists some sequence {Dn}n
of finite subsets of M such that m is the weak limit of some sequence of Nash equilibria of the restriction
of G to Dni . Could the approximation be chosen so that any limit point of any sequence of Nash equilibria
is a finite mixed deviation equilibrium?
Definition 9 G admits an F.M.D.E. strategic approximation if there is a sequence of finite sets {Dn ⊂
M}n of mixed strategies such that for any larger sequence {D′ni ⊃ Dni }n, any limit point of mixed equilibria
of G
′n = (D
′n
i , ui)i∈N is an F.M.D.E of G.
Theorem 10 Every compact-metric game admits an F.M.D.E. strategic approximation.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one in Reny [30] (Theorem 4.1). If (m, v) ∈ Γ′ is not a finite mixed
deviation equilibrium, then there is V (m,v) a neighborhood of (m, v) and a finite set D such that for any
D′ that contains D and any equilibrium m′ of the game restricted to D′, (m′, u(m′)) is not in V (m,v).
Thus, the set of non-finite mixed deviation equilibria is open. Consequently, there is a countable basis
{V (mn,vn)}n that covers the set of non F.M.D.E, to which we can associate a sequence of finite sets {Dn}n.
Without any loss of generality, we can assume this sequence of sets to be increasing. Consequently, if
{mn}n is a sequence of equilibria associated to D′ni ⊃ Dni , then (mn, u(mn)) is not in V (mk,vk) for all
k ≤ n. Consequently, every limit point of the sequence must be a finite mixed deviation equilibrium.
The following remarks are in order:
• For games with the weak finite deviation property (in particular for mixed better-reply secure games,
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and for games with the finite mixed deviation property), an F.M.D.E. strategic approximation is a
(Nash) strategic approximation of G′ (thus, we obtain Theorem 4.1 in Reny [30]).
• Every sequence of Nash equilibria of the F.M.D.E. strategic approximation converges (up to a
subsequence) to a solution a` la Simon-Zame (just use in the proof of theorem 6 the F.M.D.E.
strategic approximation).
• Theorem 10 can be extended to Reny’s finite support deviation property as follows. For every
compact-metric game, there exists an F.P.D.E. strategic approximation defined as follows: a se-
quence of finite sets (Dni ⊂ Xi)i∈N of pure strategies such that any limit point of mixed equilibria
of Gn = (Dni , ui)i∈N is a finite pure deviation equilibrium of G. Consequently, for games for which
F.P.D.E. and mixed Nash equilibria coincide (in particular for games with the finite pure deviation
property), an F.M.D.E. strategic approximation is a finite-support strategic approximation of G′ a`
la Reny (which gives Theorem 5.1 in Reny [30]).
The same logic applies to approximated equilibria: for games in which finite mixed deviation equilibria
and approximated equilibria coincide, we obtain the existence of an approximated strategic approximation,
defined as follows.
Definition 11 A game G has an approximated strategic approximation if there is a sequence of mixed
discretizations whose mixed equilibria have approximated equilibria of G as accumulation points.
What should be concluded? A more general approach to prove that a game admits an approximated
equilibrium, consists in finding a strategic approximation instead of checking that it is approximately
better-reply secure. The following proposition illustrates this idea:
Proposition 12 Any diagonal game where f , g and h are continuous admits an approximated strategic
approximation and, consequently, an approximated equilibrium in mixed strategies.
The proposition, proved in Appendix 8.3, extends a similar result in Laraki et al. [22] for timing
games. Some remarks are of importance:
• Laraki et al. [22] provide a 3-player timing game without approximated mixed equilibrium. Thus,
the existence result above does not extend to 3-player diagonal games without additional assump-
tions.
• The well-known Sion-Wolfe’s [33] zero-sum game on the square without a value shows that the
existence of an approximated equilibrium fails when the game admits two lines of discontinuities
instead of only one (the diagonal).
• The proof and so the result could be extended to two-player games on the square where disconti-
nuities are along a one dimensional curve given by some continuous one-to-one function y = φ(x)
instead of the diagonal y = x. A similar observation could be made in pure strategies. This al-
lows coverage of games such as the California location game (which can easily be mapped to a
quasiconcave compact game on the square with one line of discontinuity).
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In applications such as auctions, diagonal games are of incomplete information. It is thus natural to
study the following extension of the previous model.
Example 11. A diagonal game with incomplete information is defined as follows. There are two
players. Each player i has a finite set of types Ti. At stage 0, a profile of types t = (t1, t2) is drawn
according to some joint probability distribution p on T = T1 × T2, and each player i is informed about
his own type ti. At stage 1, players chose simultaneously an element in the unit interval [0, 1] (bid, time,
price, quantity, location, etc.). The payoff function of player i type-dependent is:
ui(ti, tj , xi, xj) = gi(ti, tj , xi, xj) 1xi>xj + fi(ti, tj , xi, xj) 1xi<xj + hi(ti, tj , x) 1xi=xj=x.
The following proposition is proved in Appendix 8.4
Proposition 13 Any diagonal game with incomplete information that satisfies conditions i), ii) and iii)
below admits an approximated strategic approximation and, consequently, an approximated mixed equilib-
rium, where:
i) there is i = 1, 2 such that for all t = (ti, tj) ∈ T , hi(ti, tj , 0) ≤ gi(ti, tj , 0, 0);
ii) there is i = 1, 2 such that for all ti ∈ Ti, x = 1 is never the unique best response of ti;
iii) f and g are continuous.
All standard models of auctions satisfy the following: a) if the other player bids 0, it is always better
to bid slightly more and win the auction at almost no cost; b) Assumption ii) is satisfied whenever all
values for all types are strictly smaller than the maximal bid (here x = 1). For example x = 1 is weakly
dominated in second price auctions and strictly dominated in first price and all-pay auctions.
Some remarks are of importance:
• First price auction with complete information has no Nash equilibrium and it is generally admitted
in the community that the player with the highest value must bid a little bit higher than the second
highest value. This is an approximated equilibrium.
• Fanga and Morris [15] provide a two-player type dependent first price auction and independent
values without a Nash equilibrium. Our proposition implies that their game has an approximated
equilibrium.
• As the proof shows, Proposition 13 is still valid if ii) is replaced with:
ii’) there is i = 1, 2 such that for all t = (ti, tj) ∈ T , hi(ti, tj , 1) ≥ fi(ti, tj , 1, 1).
This condition is satisfied in first and second price auctions but not in all-pay auctions. That is
why our proposition is stated with Condition i).
• The strategic approximation constructed in the proof is such that there will be zero probability that
the two players submit the same bid. The resulting approximated equilibrium is thus independent
on the value of the tie-breaking rule h, as soon as assumption i) is satisfied.
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• Barelli et al. [4] combine tie-breaking rules and better-reply security ideas to prove existence of
Nash or approximated equilibria in a general class of zero-sum games including majority voting and
Colonel Blotto games.
The following is a minimal counterexample showing that without assumptions i) or ii), an approxi-
mated equilibrium fails to exist!
Example 12.
We consider a zero-sum timing game which may be viewed as a diagonal game with constant payoff
functions f , g and h.
Each player should decide when to stop the game between 0 and 1. The game stops at the first
moment when one of the two players stops. If both players stop simultaneously before the exit time t = 1
or no player stops before time t = 1, then there is a tie (payoff is given by h).
Player 2 has two types A and B with equal probabilities. Player 1 has only one type. If player 1
stops first he gets f = 1. If player 1 stops second he gets g = −1. Only the payoff when the players stop
simultaneously depend on the type of player 2. If the type is A, player 1 has an advantage and gets the
payoff h = 3 and if the type is B, player 1 has a disadvantage and gets the payoff h = −2.
−1
1
3
x = 0 x = 1
y = 0
y = 1
−1
1 −2
x = 0 x = 1
y = 0
y = 1
Figure 1: Representation of u1(x, y) of type A and B.
Let us show that the max min ≤ − 12 and that the min max ≥ − 14 , so that the game has no value and
so no approximated equilibrium.
Start with the maxmin. Let α be the probability with which player 1 stops at x = 0 (so with
probability (1− α) he stops after zero). If α = 0, player 2 by stoping at time zero gets 1 (and so player
1 gets −1). If α > 0, type A for player 2 can stop uniformly between 0 and some  where  is very small
so that with high probability, if the game has not been stopped at time zero, he is stopped by player 2
(just after zero). Assume that type B of player 2 stops at time zero. Payoff of player 1 is thus very close
to α( 12 × 1 + 12 ×−2) + (1− α)×−1. Consequently, the best strategy for player 1 against such behavior
by player 2 is to stop at t = 0 with probability 1 so that max min ≤ − 12 .
Let us now compute the min max. Let us restrict player 1 to playing best-replies to the following set
of strategies : (1) to stop at time t = 0 or (2) to stop uniformly between 0 and some  very small, which
depends of course on the strategy of player 2. Knowing this behavior, type B must stop at time zero.
Let β be the probability that type A stops at time zero. The payoff of player 1 if he stops at 0 (choose
option 1) is 12 ×−2 + 12 × (β× 3 + (1−β)× 1) = −12 +β, while if he chooses option 2 his payoff is close to
1
2 ×−1 + 12 (β ×−1 + (1− β)× 1) = −β. Thus, the optimal β for type B against this behavior of player
1 must be equalizing and so is β = 14 . Consequently, min max ≥ − 14 .
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6 Some Extensions in Pure Strategies
There have been many extensions of Reny’s B.R.S. existence result. In this section, we explain how to
adapt the previous results and deal with these extensions.
6.1 Barelli-Soza Equilibrium
The Reny security condition is strong: it asks for existence of a deviation di with the property that
ui(di, x
′
−i) > vi for every x
′ in some neighborhood of x. Barelli and Soza propose a natural improvement:
they just allow di to depend continuously on x
′
−i, meaning that ui(di(x
′
−i), x
′
−i) > vi for every x
′ in some
neighborhood of x, where di(.) is a continuous function from a neighborhood of x−i to Xi.
In fact, Barelli and Soza go further and ask for existence of a “Kakutani” multivalued mapping9 Φi(.)
from a neighborhood of x−i to Xi, such that ui(d′i, x
′
−i) > vi for every x
′ in some neighborhood of x and
every d′i ∈ Φi(x′−i).
Definition (Barelli-Soza [3, 5]): a game G is generalized better-reply secure if whenever
(x, v) ∈ Γ and x is not a Nash equilibrium, then there is a player i, a neighborhood U of x−i,
Φi a Kakutani’s mapping from U to Xi, and αi > vi, such that for every x
′ in the graph of
Φi, ui(x
′) > αi.
Then Barelli and Soza prove the following theorem.
Barelli-Soza’s theorem [3, 5]: if G is quasiconcave, compact and generalized better-reply
secure, then it admits a Nash equilibrium.
In Section 2, Reny’s better-reply security assumption is defined using the lower semicontinuous reg-
ularization ui of ui. Similarly, one can define generalized better-reply security using the following subtle
regularization ui of ui:
∀(xi, x−i) ∈ X, ui(xi, x−i) := supU∈V(x−i) supΦi∈WU (xi,x−i) infx′∈GrΦi ui(x′), (1)
where V(x−i) denotes the set of neighborhoods of x−i and WU (xi, x−i) is the set of multi-valued
mappings Φi from U to Xi such that xi ∈ Φi(x−i), and which are Kakutani mapping.
From the definition of ui, G is generalized better-reply secure if whenever (x, v) ∈ Γ and x is not a
Nash equilibrium, then there is a player i and di ∈ Xi such that
ui(di, x−i) > vi.
In the spirit of Definition 2, we can define.
Definition 14 A Barelli-Soza equilibrium is a couple (x, v) ∈ Γ such that:
∀i ∈ N, sup
di∈Xi
ui(di, x−i) ≤ vi.
9Φi is a Kakutani mapping if it has a closed graph, with non-empty and convex values.
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From Barelli-Soza’s Theorem above, we deduce the existence of a Barelli-Soza equilibrium (exactly as
we have deduced the existence of a Reny equilibrium from Reny’s existence result).10 Similarly, we can
refine the existence of a sharing-rule equilibrium, substituting ui for ui in Definition 1.
Finally, observe that Barelli-Soza equilibrium refines Reny equilibrium simply because ui ≤ ui (one
can take constant mappings Φi = xi in the supremum of Equation (1) above). This is a strict refinement
as the following example shows.
Example 13. Consider a two-player diagonal game with X1 = X2 = [0, 1], ui(xi, x−i) = 0 if xi 6= x−i
and ui(xi, x−i) = 1 otherwise. Every strategy profile is a Reny equilibrium, because ui = 0 for every i,
and ui = 0 on a dense subset of X. On the other hand, the set of Barelli-Soza equilibria, which coincides
with the set of Nash equilibria, is equal to the diagonal. Indeed, ui = ui for every i, since for every
(xi, xi), we can take Φi(x
′
−i) = x
′
−i in the supremum of Equation (1).
Note that it is not possible to skip the Kakutani regularity requirement on Φi in Definition 14, and
still have existence, as it is proved in Appendix 8.7.
The existence of a Barelli-Soza equilibrium drives to a re-interpretation of generalized better-reply
security notion, since a game G is generalized better-reply secure if and only if the set of Nash equilibria
and the set of Barelli-Soza equilibria coincide. But the interest of Barelli-Soza equilibrium goes beyond
this: as for Reny equilibrium, this is a tool to prove the existence of approximated equilibria. The fol-
lowing class of diagonal games, which differs from the class of Proposition 6, is an illustration.
Proposition 15 For any quasiconcave diagonal game such that fi, gi and hi are continuous, Barelli-Soza
and approximated equilibria coincide (so that the game admits an approximated equilibrium).
This result (proved in Appendix 8.5) is not covered by Barelli-Soza existence result, because some
games in the class may possess no Nash equilibrium, as the following example illustrates. Consider the
quasiconcave two-player diagonal game where the strategy spaces are X = Y = [0, 1], and the payoff
functions ui are defined by
u1(x, y) =

1 + x− y if x < y
0 if x = y
−1 if x > y
u2(x, y) = y.
The only optimal strategy of player 2 is y = 1, which gives no optimal strategy for player 1. Thus,
there is no Nash equilibrium, although fi, gi and hi are continuous. On the other hand, there is an
approximated equilibrium (x = (1, 1), v = (1, 1)) , since (1− ε, 1) is ε−optimal for player 1 and optimal
for player 2. We let the reader check that it is the unique approximated equilibrium, and also the unique
Barelli-Soza equilibrium.
10In Appendix 8.6 is given an independent proof of the existence of a Barelli-Soza equilibrium. As a matter of fact, it
proves the existence of a tight equilibrium (defined in Section 6.3), which refines simultaneously Barelli-Soza equilibrium,
and a recent extension of Reny’s work ([29]).
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6.2 Non-Quasiconcave Payoffs
Many games in the literature have non-quasiconcave and discontinuous payoff functions, while they still
have a Nash or an approximated equilibrium in pure strategies. This subsection explains how the tools
presented in the last sections can be adapted to that case, using a quasi-concavification approach. This
also provides a new interpretation of some recent existence results in the literature [5, 8, 24].
For every game G = ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ), we define the quasiconcave game qcav(G) as
qcav(G) = ((Xi)i∈N , (qcav(ui))i∈N )
where for every x−i ∈ X−i, qcav(ui)(., x−i) is the quasiconcave envelop of ui(., x−i) with respect to player
i’s strategy profile, i.e. the smallest quasiconcave mapping above ui(., x−i).11
Definition 16 For every game G, a quasi-equilibrium of G is a Reny equilibrium of qcav(G).
From Theorem 1, we derive for every game G the existence of a quasi-equilibrium.
This leads to many Nash existence results in the literature. By defining the class of games G for
which the set of Nash and quasi-equilibria coincide, one obtains the class of strongly better-reply secure
games introduced by Bich ([8]). The existence results in Barelli-Soza [3] and Mc-lennan et al. [24] can
be obtained from the quasiconcave case, in a similar way.
As an application, consider a standard Hotelling game.
Example 14. On a line of length l, two sellers i = 1, 2 of a homogeneous product are located at l2 − ε
and l2 + ε, where ε ∈ [0, l2 ]. For simplicity, we consider only the symmetric case. Customers are supposed
to be uniformly distributed on [0, l], and each customer chooses the seller with the lowest delivery price.
Let c be the transportation rate, and pi the mill price of seller i (who is player i). Under standard
assumptions, the payoff of player i can be written:
ui(pi, p−i) =
l
2
pi +
pi(p−i − pi)
2c
if | pi − p−i |≤ 2cε,
ui(pi, p−i) = lpi if pi < p−i − 2cε
and
ui(pi, p−i) = 0 if pi > p−i + 2cε.
D’aspremont et al. [14] proved that there exists no equilibrium when sellers are close to each other
(more precisely, when ε < l4 ). Remarkably, this is exactly the case for which Nash and quasi-equilibria
coincide, as the following proposition states.
Proposition 17 The set of Nash and quasi-equilibria of G coincide in the Hotelling game if and only if
ε ≥ l4 (which holds from [14] if and only if G has a Nash equilibrium).
11Formally,
qcav(ui)(x) = sup{min{ui(yk, x−i)}nk=1},
where the supremum is taken over all n ∈ N∗ and all families {y1, ..., yn} of Xi such that xi ∈ co{y1, ..., yn}. Hence, the
game G is quasiconcave if and only if qcav(ui) = ui for every i ∈ N .
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The following points explain the proposition and provide more details (the formal proofs of our
statement are left to the reader).
• For ε ∈ [ l4 , l2 ], (cl, cl) is the only Nash and quasi-equilibrium of G: the payoff of player i (given the
Nash strategy cl of the other player −i) is represented on Figure 1, 2 and 3.
0 cl 2cl
pi
ui(pi, cl)
0
Figure 1: Graph of ui(., cl) for ε =
l
2 .
0 p(ε) cl
pi
ui(pi, cl)
2cl
0
Figure 2: Graph of ui(., cl) for ε ∈] l2 , l4 [,
where p(ε) = cl − 2cε.
0 r(ε)
q(ε)
q(ε)+cl
2
pi
ui(pi, q(ε))
2cl
0
Figure 3: Graph of ui(., q(ε)) for ε ∈ [0, l4 ],
where r(ε) = q(ε)− 2cε and
q(ε) = 3cl −√8c2l2 − 16c2lε.
• For ε ∈] l
4+
√
20
, l4 [, the only quasi-equilibrium is (q(ε), q(ε)) where q(ε) = 3cl −
√
8c2l2 − 16c2lε; it
is not a Nash equilibrium. For every η > 0, it provides an η−equilibrium for ε < l4 close enough to
l
4 .
• For ε ∈ [0, l
4+
√
20
], the situation is more complicated: (q(ε), q(ε)) is also a quasi-equilibrium, but
there can be more. For example, (r(ε), r(ε) − 2cε) or (r(ε) − 2cε, r(ε)) are quasi equilibria, where
r(ε) = 3lcε−2cε
2
l
2+ε
). The following Figure 4 illustrates the example of (r(ε), r(ε) − 2cε) (which is
not a Nash equilibrium); player 1 strategy is optimal, and player 2 strategy is close to an optimal
strategy, in the sense that it is the limit of an ε-optimal strategy when ε tends to 0. For every
η > 0, it provides an η−equilibrium for ε > 0 small enough.
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0 r(ε)− 4cε p1
u1(p1, r(ε)− 2cε)
r(ε)
0
Graph of u1(., r(ε)− 2cε) for ε ≤ l4+√20
0 r(ε)− 2cε p2
u2(r(ε), p2)
r(ε) + 2cε
0
Graph of u2(r(ε), .) for ε ≤ l4+√20 .
Recall that in his seminal paper, Hotelling proposes (cl, cl) as a Nash equilibrium even for ε < l4 ,
although it is not even a quasi-equilibrium.
6.3 Reny’s Lower Single Deviation Property
Reny proposes the following refinement of better-reply security.
Definition (Reny [29]): G has the lower single deviation property if whenever x ∈ X is not
a Nash equilibrium, there exists d ∈ X and a neighborhood V of x such that for every z ∈ V ,
there exists a player i, such that
∀x′ ∈ V, ui(di, x′−i) > ui(z)
Then Reny proves the following.
Reny’s theorem [29]: Any quasiconcave, compact game that has the lower single deviation
property admits a Nash equilibrium.
Note that if G is better-reply secure, then it has the lower single deviation property. Indeed, by
contradiction, assume that there exists x ∈ X which is not a Nash equilibrium and such that for every
d ∈ X and every neighborhood V of x, there exists z ∈ V such that for every player i, there exists x′ ∈ V
such that:
ui(di, x
′
−i) ≤ ui(z) ≤ ui(z)
Then, shrinking V to x in the above equation, and taking v to be a limit in the sense of nets of u(z),
we obtain easily that (x, v) is a Reny equilibrium, thus a Nash equilibrium, which is contradictory.
The following example proves that lower single deviation property is a strict refinement of better-reply
security:
Example 15. Consider a two-player diagonal game with X1 = X2 = [0, 1],
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u1(x, y) =

0 if x < y or (x, y) = (0, 0)
1− x if x = y > 0
1 if x > y
and u2(x, y) = u1(y, x).
1
0
0
1− x
x = 0 x = 1
y = 0
y = 1
0
0
1
1− x
x = 0 x = 1
y = 0
y = 1
Figure 1: Representation of u1(x, y) and u2(x, y) in Example 15
G is neither better-reply secure nor generalized better-reply secure. Indeed, consider the sequence of
strategy profile ( 1n ,
1
n ). At the limit we get (x, v) = ((0, 0), (1, 1)) ∈ Γ. No player can secure strictly more
than 1 at (0, 0), although (0, 0) is not a Nash equilibrium. On the other side, this game has the lower
single deviation property, since one has
u1(x, y) =
 0 if x ≤ y1 if x > y
and
u2(x, y) = u1(y, x) for every (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1],
and we let the reader check that G has the lower single deviation property, taking d = (1, 1) in the
definition.
In this subsection, we provide a refinement of Reny equilibrium that implies the two refinements above
(Reny and Barelli-Soza).12 First define, for every Φi ∈WU (xi, x−i):
uΦii (xi, x−i) := supU∈V(x−i) infx′∈GrΦi ui(x
′), (2)
Theorem 7. Every quasiconcave and compact game G admits a tight equilibrium: that is, there
exists x ∈ X such that for every neighborhood V of x and every (Φi)i∈N in Πi∈NWV (x−i), there exists
z ∈ V such that for every i ∈ N there exists x′ ∈ V and d′i ∈ Φi(x′−i) such that uΦii (d′i, x′−i) ≤ ui(z).
The proof is given in Appendix 8.6, and is the direct consequence of a new selection lemma combined
with Kakutani [20] fixed-point theorem. Note the following consequences:
12Our refinement can be adapted to the non-quasiconcave case, as explained in the previous subsection, so that it covers
most of the recent literature.
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• For every player i and every di ∈ Xi, if we take Φi(x′−i) = di above, we obtain as a particular
case the existence, for every quasiconcave and compact game G, of x ∈ X such that: for every
neighborhood V of x and every d ∈ X, there exists z ∈ V such that for every i ∈ N , there exists
x′ ∈ V such that ui(di, x′−i) ≤ ui(z). Applying this to the payoff functions ui (which has the same
quasiconcavity property as ui), we obtain the existence of a Nash equilibrium when the game has
the lower single deviation assumption, as the reader can check.
• Shrinking V to x in the definition of a tight equilibrium, and taking v to be a limit in the sense of
nets of u(z), we obtain the existence of a Barelli-Soza equilibrium (x, v).
As a consequence, our paper is mathematically self contained.
7 Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a unifying framework that encompasses Simon-Zame
and Reny in pure and mixed strategies, and to apply it to obtain new existence results of approximated
Nash equilibria. We think that it makes more explicit the relationship between better-reply security,
sharing-rules and approximated equilibria. In particular, the limit payoff in Reny’s better-reply security
can be interpreted as a tie-breaking rule, but also, for a large number of games, as a limit of payoffs of
approximated equilibria. In the future, an important question would be to characterize more precisely
the class of approximately better-reply secure games.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 6
We first need the following lemma:
Lemma 18 Let G = ((fi, gi, hi)i=1,2) be a diagonal game satisfying i) and ii) of Proposition 6. Then:
a) G is payoff secure at every x. In particular, supdi∈[0,1] ui(di, x−i) = supdi∈[0,1] ui(di, x−i).
b) For every x−i ∈]0, 1[, the function Vi(x−i) = supdi∈[0,1] ui(di, x−i) is continuous at x−i.
c) For every i = 1, 2, if fi(0, 0) ≤ gi(0, 0) then Vi(x−i) is continuous at x−i = 0.
d) For every i = 1, 2, if fi(0, 0) > gi(0, 0) then:
(i) for every ε > 0, supdi∈[0,1] ui(di, x−i) ≤ ui(0, x−i) + ε for x−i > 0 small enough.
(ii) supdi∈[0,1] ui(di, 0) = ui(0, 0). In particular, if fi(0, 0) > gi(0, 0) is true for both players, then
(0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 18. a) First remark that G = ((fi, gi, hi)i=1,2) is payoff secure at every x = (xi, x−i) ∈
[0, 1] × [0, 1] for which xi 6= x−i (because the payoff functions ui are continuous at such x). Thus, we
have to prove payoff security at (xi, xi) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]. First assume xi ∈]0, 1[. From hi(xi, xi) ∈
co{fi(xi, xi), gi(xi, xi)}, for every ε > 0, player i can secure ui(xi, xi)− ε = hi(xi, xi)− ε, playing xi + η
or xi − η (for η small enough). We now treat the case xi = 0: from hi(0, 0) ∈ co{fi(0, 0), gi(0, 0)},
either hi(0, 0) ≤ gi(0, 0), and player i can secure ui(0, 0) − ε (playing xi + η for η small enough), or
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hi(0, 0) ≤ fi(0, 0): in this case, player i can secure ui(0, 0) − ε = hi(0, 0) − ε, playing (0, 0), because for
η > 0 small enough, ui(0, η) = fi(0, η) > hi(0, 0)− ε.
b) Let x−i ∈]0, 1[. From hi(xi, xi) ∈ co{fi(xi, xi), gi(xi, xi)} and from the continuity of fi and gi, we get
Vi(x−i) := sup
di∈[0,1]
ui(di, x−i) = max{ sup
di∈[0,x−i]
fi(di, x−i), sup
di∈[x−i,1]
gi(di, x−i)}. (3)
Thus, from Berge Maximum Theorem (see [1]), the mapping supdi∈[0,1] ui(di, x−i) is continuous at every
x−i ∈]0, 1[.
c) Suppose fi(0, 0) ≤ gi(0, 0) for some i ∈ {1, 2}. From hi(0, 0) ∈ co{fi(0, 0), gi(0, 0)}, we get fi(0, 0) ≤
hi(0, 0) ≤ gi(0, 0). Fix ε > 0. Since fi and gi are continuous, we obtain
hi(xi, xi) ≤ gi(xi, xi) + ε (4)
and
fi(xi, xi) ≤ gi(xi, xi) + ε (5)
for xi small enough.
The definition of ui, the continuity of gi and hi(0, 0) ≤ gi(0, 0) give, for xi ≥ 0 small enough:
sup
di∈[0,1]
ui(di, 0) = max{hi(0, 0), sup
di∈[0,1]
gi(di, 0)} = sup
di∈[0,1]
gi(di, 0) ≥ sup
di∈[0,1]
gi(di, xi)− ε (6)
From the continuity of fi and gi, and from Inequalities 4 and 5, we get, for xi > 0 small enough:
sup
di∈[xi,1]
gi(di, xi) ≥ gi(xi, xi) > hi(xi, xi)− ε (7)
and
sup
di∈[xi,1]
gi(di, xi) ≥ gi(xi, xi) ≥ sup
di∈[0,xi]
fi(di, xi)− 2ε (8)
Consequently, from the definition of ui, the previous inequalities imply
sup
di∈[0,1]
ui(di, xi) = max{ sup
di∈[0,x−i]
fi(di, x−i), hi(xi, xi), sup
di∈[x−i,1]
gi(di, x−i)} ≤ sup
di∈[0,1]
gi(di, xi) + 2ε (9)
for xi > 0 small enough. From Inequalities 6 and 9, we get
sup
di∈[0,1]
ui(di, xi) ≤ sup
di∈[0,1]
ui(di, 0) + 3ε
for xi ≥ 0 small enough, which proves that Vi(x−i) = supdi∈[0,1] ui(di, x−i) is upper semicontinuous at
x−i = 0. But from a), Vi(.) is also lower semicontinuous, as the supremum of a family of lower semicon-
tinuous mappings. This finally proves that Vi is continuous.
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d) Suppose for example i = 1. We use the following Claim:
Claim 1 If l is a quasiconcave function from [0, 1] to R and l(y) < l(x) for some x < y in [0, 1] then for
every z ∈ [y, 1], l(z) ≤ l(y). The proof is straightforward: indeed, for every z = λy + (1 − λ)1, where
λ ∈ [0, 1], the quasiconcavity of l gives l(y) ≥ min{l(x), l(z)}, because y ∈ [x, z]. Since l(y) < l(x), we
obtain l(y) ≥ l(z).
Proof of d) i) The inequality f1(0, 0) > g1(0, 0) implies f1(0, x2) > g1(x2, x2) for x2 ≥ 0 small enough.
Applying Claim 1 to u1(., x2), we obtain:
sup
d1∈[x2,1]
g1(d1, x2) = g1(x2, x2) (10)
Let ε > 0. The continuity of f1 leads to
sup
d1∈[0,x2]
f1(d1, x2) ≤ f1(0, x2) + ε (11)
for x2 > 0 small enough. Hence, from h1(x1, x1) ∈ co{f1(x1, x1), g1(x1, x1)}, we obtain
sup
d1∈[0,1]
u1(d1, x2) = max{ sup
d1∈[0,x2]
f1(d1, x2), h1(x2, x2), sup
d1∈[x2,1]
g1(d1, x2)} ≤ f1(0, x2) + ε = u1(0, x2) + ε
(12)
for x2 > 0 small enough.
Proof of d) ii) From the continuity of g1, passing to the limit x2 → 0 in Equation 10, we obtain
supd1∈[0,1] g1(d1, 0) = g1(0, 0). Since h1(0, 0) ∈ [g1(0, 0), f1(0, 0)], this gives
sup
d1∈[0,1]
u1(d1, 0) = max{h1(0, 0), sup
d1∈[0,1]
g1(d1, 0)} ≤ h1(0, 0) = u1(0, 0),
which proves (ii).
Proof of Proposition 6. Let (x1, x2, v1, v2) ∈ Γ be a Reny equilibrium of G, and prove it to be an
approximated equilibrium. From the definition of a Reny equilibrium and from point a) of Lemma 18,
we get:
Vi(x−i) = sup
di∈[0,1]
ui(di, x−i) ≤ vi, i = 1, 2. (13)
Step 1. Assume x1 6= x2. In this case, ui is continuous at x = (x1, x2), vi = ui(x), and Inequation 13
means that x is a Nash equilibrium.
Step 2. Assume x1 = x2 ∈]0, 1[. From b) of Lemma 18, the function Vi(x−i) = supdi∈[0,1] ui(di, x−i) is
continuous at x1 = x2 for every i ∈ {1, 2}. Consequently, from Inequation 13 and since (x1, x1, v1, v2) is in
the closure of the graph of the payoff functions, for every ε > 0, there exists (x′1, x
′
2, u1(x
′
1, x
′
2), u2(x
′
1, x
′
2))
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close enough to (x1, x1, v1, v2) such that:
Vi(x
′
−i) = sup
di∈[0,1]
ui(di, x
′
−i) ≤ ui(x′1, x′2) + ε, i = 1, 2. (14)
Therefore, (x1, x1) is an approximated equilibrium.
Step 3. To finish, suppose (x1, x2) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1)}. We consider only the case (x1, x2) = (0, 0), the case
(x1, x2) = (1, 1) being similar. Depending on the local configuration of the payoff functions around (0, 0),
we should examine 9 cases: fi(0, 0) < gi(0, 0), fi(0, 0) = gi(0, 0) and fi(0, 0) > gi(0, 0), for every i = 1, 2.
For symmetry reason (permuting players if necessary), only the 3 following cases have to be considered:
First Case. fi(0, 0) ≤ gi(0, 0) for every i = 1, 2. From c) of Lemma 18, Vi(x−i) is continuous at x−i = 0
for every player i. Thus, we are exactly in the situation of Step 2, and (0, 0) is an approximated equilib-
rium.
Second Case. fi(0, 0) > gi(0, 0) for every i = 1, 2. From d) of Lemma 18, this implies that (0, 0) is a
Nash equilibrium.
Third Case. f1(0, 0) > g1(0, 0) and f2(0, 0) ≤ g2(0, 0). Since (x1, x1, v1, v2) is in the closure of the
graph of the payoff functions, v2 = limn→+∞ u2(xn) for some sequence of strategy profiles xn converging
to (0, 0). From h2(xi, xi) ∈ co{f2(xi, xi), g2(xi, xi)}, we get u2(xn) ≤ max{f2(xn), g2(xn)}. Thus, from
the continuity of f2 and g2, we obtain
v2 ≤ g2(0, 0). (15)
Thus, taking ε > 0, and from Inequation 13 for i = 2,
sup
d2∈[0,1]
u2(0, d2) ≤ v2 ≤ g2(0, 0) ≤ g2(0, x2) + ε = u2(0, x2) + ε. (16)
for x2 > 0 small enough. But from Lemma 18 (d) i), supd1∈[0,1] u1(d1, x2) ≤ u1(0, x2) + ε for x2 > 0
small enough, i.e. (0, x2) is an ε−equilibrium.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 6
Let (m, v) be a finite mixed deviation equilibrium. First let us prove that it is a Reny equilibrium of the
mixed extension of the game: for every deviation d ∈M , and any neighborhood V of (m, v), the definition
of a finite mixed deviation equilibrium gives mV ∈ M such that: (1) for every i, ui(di,mV−i) ≤ ui(mV );
(2) (mV , u(mV )) ∈ V . Shrinking V to (m, v) implies that ui(di,m−i) ≤ vi for every d ∈M , i.e. (m, v) is
a Reny equilibrium of the mixed extension of G.
Now, let us prove that (m, v) induces a solution a` la Simon-Zame. Since M is metric, there exists
a countable decreasing basis of neighborhoods V n of (m, v) in Γ′. Consider a sequence Dn = Πi∈IDni
converging to X for the Hausdorff distance. By definition of a finite mixed deviation equilibrium, for
every integer n, there exists a finite set D
′n = Πi∈ID
′n
i of M containing D
n, and a probability mn
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which is a Nash of the game restricted to D
′n, and such that (mn, u(mn)) ∈ V n. Recall that Simon
and Zame’s [32] existence proof consists in approximating the game by a finite one in pure-strategies
(here Dn), and considering a weak limit of a sequence (mn) of Nash equilibria of this approximation.
We cannot apply Simon and Zame’s proof directly to the Nash equilibria mn of the finite games D′n,
because D′n is a mixed-strategy game. But D
′n ⊃ Dn: thus, no player i has a deviation in Dni against
mn, and we shall prove that this property is sufficient to adapt Simon-Zame’s proof. Remark that the
sequence (mn) converges (strongly and weakly) to m. Let E be the space of RN -valued vector measure
on X, endowed with the weak* topology. Consider the sequence (u.mn)n∈N of the compact space E
(here, u.mn denotes the RN -valued measure on X defined by u.mn(F ) =
∫
F
u dmn for every Borelian
set F of X). Without any loss of generality, up to a subsequence, this sequence converges to some
measure ν. From Lemma 2, p.867 (Simon-Zame [32]), there exists a Borel measurable selection q of
Q, the multivalued function from X to RN , defined by Q(x) =co Γx, such that the ν = q.m (remark
that the proof of this lemma does not use the support of mn, but only the fact that u is a selection
of Q). Thus, q is a sharing rule (in the sense of Simon-Zame) of the game G. Define, for every player
i, Hi = {x ∈ Xi :
∫
qid(δx × m−i) >
∫
qid(mi × m−i)}. We prove mi(Hi) = 0: otherwise, consider
K ⊂ Hi ⊂ U , where K is compact, U open, mi(U − K) < ε with ε > 0, and with mi(K) > 0. Let
f : Xi → [0, 1] be a continuous function which is identically equal to 1 on K and 0 on the complement
of U . Consider the strategy βni =
fmni∫
fdmni
: it is a better response to mn−i for n large enough and ε > 0
small enough, which contradicts the fact that mn is a Nash of the game restricted to D
′n. From Simon
Zame ([32], Step 5 and Step 6), there exists a modification q˜ of q, such that q = q˜ except on a set of
m−measure 0, such that m is a Nash equilibrium of the game G˜ = ((Xi)i∈N , (q˜i)i∈N ), and q˜(m) = q(m).
More precisely, take p˜i a Borel measurable selection of Q which minimizes the i-th component of Q, define
T = {x ∈ X : xi ∈ Hi for at least two indices i ∈ N}, define q˜(x) = p˜i(x) if x ∈ Hi ×X−i but x /∈ T ,
and q˜(x) = q(x) otherwise. To prove m is a Nash of G˜, assume that some player i has a better pure
response than mi, denoted δx, to m−i. Then the case x /∈ Hi yields an easy contradiction. For the second
case, simply consider a sequence xn converging to x such that xn ∈ Dni (here, we use that Dn = Πi∈IDni
converges to X for the Hausdorff distance): an easy limit argument proves that δxn is a better response
than mni to m
n
−i for n large enough, a contradiction with the choice of m
n.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 12
The proof is done by constructing a strategic approximation. Call x ∈ [0, 1] a right local equilibrium if
hi(x, x) > gi(x, x) for every i = 1, 2 and a left local equilibrium if hi(x, x) > fi(x, x) for every i = 1, 2.
Thus, if players are supposed to play (x, x) and if x is a right local equilibrium, no player has an interest
to deviate to some strategy in some right neighborhood of x (but he may have a profitable deviation
outside that neighborhood) and similarly for left equilibria.
Let x0 be the largest element in [0, 1] such that all x < x0 are right local equilibria and y0 be the
smallest element in [0, 1] such that all y > y0 are left local equilibria. Observe that x0 may be 0 and y0
could be 1.
By continuity of f , g and h, if x0 < 1 then hi(x0, x0) ≤ gi(x0, x0) for some i ∈ {0, 1} and similarly, if
y0 > 0 then hi(y0, y0) ≤ fi(y0, y0) for some i ∈ {0, 1}. We now examine three different cases:
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First case. x0 > y0. Let D be some finite discretization of [0, 1] with a mesh smaller than η > 0 so
that payoff functions f and g do not change by more than ε2 if a player moves by no more than η and
such that if x < x0 is in D, then hi(x, x) > gi(y, x) for all x < y < x + η and if x > y0 is in D, then
hi(x, x) > fi(y, x) for all x > y > x + η. Without any loss of generality, we can assume that 0 and 1
belong to D.
Let us show that for any mixed strategy σj of player j that belongs to D, there is an ε-best reply of
player i in the entire game G that belongs to D. This will imply that any mixed equilibrium of the game
restricted to D is an ε-equilibrium of the full game, so that D is a strategic approximation that leads to
approximated equilibria (i.e., the game admits an approximated strategic approximation).
Let y ∈ [0, 1] be some ε/2-best reply to σj of player i which is not in D (if such strategy does not exist,
this is finished). Then either y < x0 or y > y0. In the first case, let z be the highest element in D smaller
than y, so that hi(z, z) > fi(y, z) by assumption of the discretization and since z is a right equilibrium.
Since player j plays a probability distribution supported on D, moving from y to z for player i induces
for him a higher payoff from the event associated to player j playing z and at most a change of ε2 on the
events where player j is playing a strategy in D different from z. Thus, z is an ε-best reply for player i.
A similar argument applies to y > y0 (use the left equilibrium property). Remark also that the argument
is the same for both players.
Second case. x0 < y0, which implies that hk(x0) ≤ gk(x0, x0) and hl(y0) ≤ fl(y0, y0) for some k ∈
{1, 2} and l ∈ {1, 2}. By continuity, we get hk(x0) < gk(x, x0) + ε4 for every x ∈]x0, x0 + η[ and
hl(y0) < fl(y, y0) +
ε
4 for every y ∈]y0 − η, y0[.
Thus, there are four cases to check, depending on the values of k and l. Let us solve explicitly the
case k = 1 and l = 2. The same idea of construction could be done in the other cases, with a small
adaptation in the strategic approximation explained below.
Fix ε > 0 and let x0 = t0 < s0 < t1, ... < sK−1 < tK = y0 be a discretization of [x0, y0] with a mesh
smaller than some η > 0 so that payoff functions f and g do not change by more than ε/4 if the pure
strategy moves by no more than η. As in the first case, let D be a finite discretization of [0, x0[∪]y0, 1]
with a mesh smaller than η > 0 so that payoff functions f and g do not change by more than ε2 if the
pure strategy moves by no more than η and such that if x < x0 is in D, then hi(x, x) > gi(y, x) for all
x < y < x + η and if x > y0 is in D, then hi(x, x) > fi(y, x) for all x > y > x + η. Assume 0 and 1
belongs to D.
In the strategic approximation we consider, player 1 is restricted to play in D or uniformly on one
of the intervals [tk, sk], k = 0, ...,K − 1, or to choose tK = y0. Player 2 is restricted to play in D or
uniformly on one of the intervals [sk, tk+1], k = 0, ...,K − 1, or to choose t0 = x0. Observe that the
intervals where players are uniformly mixing are disjoint and alternate.
Let σ be some strategy of player 2 in the restricted game. Let us show that player 1 has an ε-best
response against σ in the full game G that belongs to his authorized set of strategies. Let y be some ε/4
pure best response of player 1 in G, which is not in the discretization D. Several subcases have to be
examined:
First subcase. If y < x0 or y > y0, we proceed as in the first case to construct an ε-best reply in D.
Second subcase. If y is in some interval ]sk, tk+1[ of player 2 (k ∈ {0, 1, ...,K − 1}), and if
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player 2 is choosing that interval with positive probability, the payoff of 1 coming from that interval
is, up to ε/4, a convex combination of his payoff if he chooses tk+1 and his payoff if he chooses sk:
more precisely, if η is a uniform strategy on [sk, tk+1], u1(y, η) =
∫ y
sk
g1(y, α)dα +
∫ tk+1
y
f1(y, α)dα =∫ y
sk
g1(y, α)dα − y−sktk+1−sk
∫ tk+1
sk
g1(y, α)dα +
∫ tk+1
y
f1(y, α)dα − tk+1−ytk+1−sk
∫ tk+1
sk
f1(y, α)dα + c where c =
y−sk
tk+1−sk
∫ tk+1
sk
g1(y, α)dα +
tk+1−y
tk+1−sk
∫ tk+1
sk
f1(y, α)dα, i.e. c is a convex combination of player 1’s payoff
if he chooses tk and his payoff if he chooses sk (player 2 playing η.) But∫ y
sk
g1(y, α)dα− y − sk
tk+1 − sk
∫ tk+1
sk
g1(y, α)dα = (y − sk)(g1(y, α1)− g1(y, α′1))
and ∫ tk+1
y
f1(y, α)dα− tk+1 − y
tk+1 − sk
∫ tk+1
sk
f1(y, α)dα = (tk+1 − y)(f1(y, α2)− f1(y, α′2))
for some α1, α
′
1 ∈ [sk, y] and α2, α′2 ∈ [y, tk+1]. Thus, from the choice of the discretization, we obtain
| u1(y, η)− c |≤ ε4 .
Now, the payoff of player 1 coming from Player 2 playing in the other intervals or in D changes by no
more that ε/4 when he moves in the interval [tk, sk+1]. Consequently, if player 1 has a
3
4ε-best response
at the extreme points tk or sk+1 of the interval. If that strategy is y0, this is fine since it is authorized
for player 1. If not, then as seen, we can restrict the analysis to 34ε-best responses z that belongs to some
interval [tk, sk], which is the next case:
Third subcase. Let z ∈ [tk, sk] being a 34ε-best response, for some k ∈ {0, 1, ...,K − 1}. If k > 0,
by assumption, there is zero probability that player 2 stops in that interval and so player 1’s payoff does
not move by more that ε/4 if he plays uniformly in [tk, sk] (which is authorized for player 1) instead of
playing z. This gives a ε-best response. If k = 0, if player 2 is playing x0 with positive probability and
player 1 is playing z = x0, then player 1 does not lose more than ε/4 by playing slightly more than x0
instead of x0 (since h1(x0) < g1(x, x0) +
ε
4 for every x ∈]x0, x0 + η[.). Thus, we still have the case where
z belongs to the interval ]t0, s0[. But, again, since his payoff moves continuously in that interval, playing
uniformly in it is an ε-best response.
The proof for player 2 is similar (we use the fact that h2(y0) < f2(y, y0) +
ε
4 for every y ∈]y0− η, y0[).
The three remaining cases for k and l are solved similarly, by a judicious choice of who of the two
players is allowed to stop at x0 and y0: if k = 2 and l = 1, then player 1 can stop at x0 and player 2
at y0; if k = 2 and l = 2, (only) player 1 is allowed to stop at both x0 and y0; if k = 1 and l = 1, only
player 2 is allowed to stop at both points. If some player can stop at x0 then it is the other player who is
authorized to stop uniformly in the small interval of the dicretization just after x0, and the intervals in
which players can stop uniformly alternate until the point y0, and the last interval belongs to the player
who is not allowed to stop at y0.
Third case. x0 = y0, implying hk(x0) < gk(x, x0) +
ε
4 for x ∈]x0, x0 + η[ and hl(x0) < fl(x, x0) + ε4 for
x ∈]x0 − η, x0[ for some k ∈ {1, 2} and l ∈ {1, 2} (if x0 is 0 or 1, then only one of the inequalities holds).
Suppose for example that h1(x0) < g1(x, x0) +
ε
4 for x ∈]x0, x0 + η[. Let D1 = {0 = t0 < ... < tK} be a
discretization on the left of x0, not including x0, and empty if x0 = 0; let D2 = {s0 < ... < sK = 1} be a
discretization on the right of x0, not including x0, and empty if y0 = 1. Again, without any loss of gener-
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ality, assume that the mesh of the discretizations is smaller than η > 0, so that payoff functions f and g
do not change by more than ε2 if a player moves by no more than η. Consider a strategic approximation
where Player 2 is allowed to play in D1 ∪D2 ∪ {x0} and player 1 to play in D1 ∪D2 or to mix uniformly
in the length [x0, s0]. Let y ∈ [0, 1] be some ε/2-best reply of player 1 to some mixed strategy of player 2
which is not in D (if such strategy does not exist, this is finished). If y < x0, moving from y to the highest
element in D1 smaller than y gives an ε-best reply for player 1. If y > x0, moving from y to the smallest
element in D1 larger than y gives an ε-best reply for player 1. Last, if y = x0, playing uniformly in [x0, y0]
instead of playing x0 is an ε-best reply for player 1, because of h1(x0) < g1(x, x0) +
ε
4 for x ∈]x0, x0 + η[.
Similarly, let z ∈ [0, 1] be some ε/2-best reply of player 2 to some mixed strategy of player 1. If z < x0 or
z > x0, then player 2 has an ε-best reply in D1 ∪D2 ∪{x0}, moving slightly above or below (this is simi-
lar to player 1). This finishes the case k = 1, and permuting player 1 and 2, we get similarly the case k = 2.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 13
The proof is similar to Case 2 in the complete information case, and use the construction of a strategic
approximation. There are four possibilities for i) and ii). Suppose i) is satisfied for player 1 and ii) for 2.
The strategic approximation should be adapted in the other 3 cases, as in the proof of Proposition 12.
Take the following discretization of [0, 1]: 0 = s0 < t0 < s1 < t1 < ... < tK < sK+1 = 1. The mesh
is supposed smaller than some η where f and g do not move by more that ε/4 when bids move by less
than η and such that for every t ∈ T , h1(t1, t2, 0) < g1(t1, t2, x, 0) + ε4 when 0 < x < η.
In the strategic approximation, player 1 is restricted to play uniformly on one of the intervals [sk, tk],
k = 0, ...,K, or to choose x = 1. Player 2 is restricted to play uniformly on one of the intervals [tk, sk+1],
k = 0, ...,K, or to choose x = 0.
This leads to a game where each player has K+1 possible mixed actions and one pure action. Observe
that the intervals where players are mixing are disjoint and alternate (player 1 can stop uniformly in the
first interval, player 2 in the second, player 1 in the third, etc.).
Let σ be some mixed strategy profile of player 2 in the finite game. Show that any type t1 has an
ε-best response against σ in the full game that belongs to his set of authorized strategies.
Let x be some ε/4 pure best response of some type t1 of player 1. If that strategy is in the interval
]tk, sk+1[ of player 2, and if some type of player 2 is choosing that interval with positive probability, the
payoff of t1 coming from that interval is, up to ε/4, a convex combination of his payoff if he chooses tk
and his payoff if he chooses sk+1 (recall that payoff functions are continuous and that all types of player 2
are restricted to the uniform distribution on that interval). The payoff of type t1 coming from the other
intervals moves by no more that ε/4 when he moves in the interval [tk, sk+1]. Consequently, if type t1
has an ε/4-best response in ]tk, sk+1[, he has a
3
4ε best response at the extreme points of the interval. If
that strategy is 1, this is fine since that strategy is authorized for player 1. If not, then we can without
loss of generality restrict the analysis to 34ε-best responses that lies in some interval [sk, tk] (of player 1).
If k > 0, by assumption, there is zero probability that player 2 stops in that interval and so player 1’s
payoff does not move by more that ε/4: playing uniformly in that interval is an ε-best response. If x = 0
and if some type of player 2 is playing 0 with positive probability, player 1 does not loose so much by
playing slightly more than 0 instead of 0. There still remains the case where x belongs to the interval
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]s0, t0[. But, again, since his payoff moves continuously in the interval, playing uniformly in it is an ε-best
response. The proof for player 2 is the same, except that we need to use assumption ii) to conclude that
player 2 can always have a best reply different from 1.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 15
This existence result is an adaptation of the proof of Proposition 6. First of all, we adapt Lemma 18 as
follows:
Lemma 19 Let G = ((fi, gi, hi)i=1,2) be a diagonal game such that fi, gi and hi are continuous. Then:
a) supdi∈[0,1] ui(di, x−i) = supdi∈[0,1] ui(di, x−i).
b) For every x−i ∈]0, 1[, the function Vi(x−i) = supdi∈[0,1] ui(di, x−i) is continuous at x−i.
c) For every i = 1, 2, if fi(0, 0) ≤ gi(0, 0) then Vi(x−i) is continuous at x−i = 0.
d) For every i = 1, 2, if fi(0, 0) > gi(0, 0) then:
(i) either hi(0, 0) ≤ fi(0, 0) and for every ε > 0, supdi∈[0,1] ui(di, x−i) ≤ ui(0, x−i) + ε for x−i ≥ 0
small enough (ε can be taken equal to 0 if x−i = 0).
(ii) or hi(0, 0) > fi(0, 0), and supdi∈[0,1] ui(di, x−i) = ui(x−i, x−i) for x−i ≥ 0 small enough.
Thus, in both cases (i) and (ii), supdi∈[0,1] ui(di, 0) = ui(0, 0).
Proof of Lemma 19. a) We can simply adapt the point a) of Lemma 18 to the following generalized
notion of payoff security: the game G is said generalized payoff secure at x if for every ε > 0 there exists
a Kakutani’s mappings from U (some neighborhood of x−i) to Xi such that ui(d′i, x
′
−i) > ui(x) − ε for
every x′−i ∈ U and every d′i ∈ Φ(x′−i). Then G = ((fi, gi, hi)i=1,2) is generalized payoff secure at every
x ∈ X: if x is not on the diagonal, this is because ui is continuous at such x, and if x = (xi, xi), we can
take Φ(xi) = xi. This implies a).
b) Let x−i ∈]0, 1[. The definition of ui gives
Vi(x−i) := sup
di∈[0,1]
ui(di, x−i) = max{ sup
di∈[0,x−i]
fi(di, x−i), hi(x−i, x−i), sup
di∈[x−i,1]
gi(di, x−i)}. (17)
Thus, from Berge Maximum Theorem (see [1]), the mapping supdi∈[0,1] ui(di, x−i) is continuous at every
x−i ∈]0, 1[.
c) Suppose fi(0, 0) ≤ gi(0, 0) for some i ∈ {1, 2}. If hi(0, 0) ≤ gi(0, 0), then the continuity of Vi at (0, 0)
is obtained as in the proof of c) of Lemma 18 (since Inequations 4 and 5 are still true, from the continuity
of fi, gi and hi). If hi(0, 0) > gi(0, 0), then Vi(xi) = hi(xi, xi) on some neighborhood of 0, which proves
the continuity of Vi at 0.
d) i) Similar to the proof of d) i) in Lemma 18. Indeed, in the proof of Equation 12, we only need
h1(x2, x2) < f1(0, x2) + ε for x2 > 0 small enough, which is true by continuity.
ii) If hi(0, 0) > fi(0, 0) then by continuity Vi(xi) = hi(xi, xi) on some neighborhood of 0.
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Proof of Proposition 19. let (x1, x2, v1, v2) ∈ Γ be a BS equilibrium of G, and prove it to be an
approximated equilibrium. From the definition of a Reny equilibrium and from point a) of Lemma 19,
we get
Vi(x−i) = sup
di∈[0,1]
ui(di, x−i) ≤ vi, i = 1, 2. (18)
Similarly to the proof of Proposition 6, we need to consider only the cases where (x1, x2) = (0, 0) and
the case f1(0, 0) > g1(0, 0) and f2(0, 0) ≤ g2(0, 0), the other cases being similar to those of the proof of
Proposition 6 (up to a permutation of players). Remark that f1(0, 0) > g1(0, 0) implies
sup
d1∈[0,1]
u1(d1, 0) = u1(0, 0) (19)
from d) of Lemma 19, i.e. 0 is a best response of player 1 against x2 = 0.
Now, we examine 2 different subcases, depending on h2(0, 0):
Subcase 1. Suppose h2(0, 0) ≥ g2(0, 0). Since (0, 0, v1, v2) is in the closure of the graph of the payoff
functions, v2 = limn→+∞ u2(xn) for some sequence of strategy profiles xn converging to (0, 0). Thus,
from h2(0, 0) ≥ g2(0, 0) ≥ f2(0, 0), and by continuity, we get v2 ≤ u2(0, 0) = h2(0, 0). From Inequations
18, this implies that 0 is a best response of player 2 against x1 = 0, thus (0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium.
Subcase 2. Now, suppose h2(0, 0) < g2(0, 0). First, assume that h1(0, 0) ≤ f1(0, 0). We can mimic the
proof of Proposition 6, Case 3 (since hi(xi, xi) ∈ co{fi(xi, xi), gi(xi, xi)} is only used to prove Inequation
9 (i.e. v2 ≤ g2(0, 0)), which can be proved here directly as in Subcase 1 above): this implies that (0, 0)
is an approximated equilibrium. Second, assume that h1(0, 0) > f1(0, 0). Equation 18 implies that
h1(0, 0) = u1(0, 0) ≤ supdi∈[0,1] ui(di, x−i) ≤ vi. Again, since (0, 0, v1, v2) is in the closure of the graph of
the payoff functions, v1 = limn→+∞ u1(xn) for some sequence of strategy profiles xn converging to (0, 0).
Thus, from h1(0, 0) > f1(0, 0) > g1(0, 0), and by continuity, x
n is on the diagonal for n large enough.
Thus v2 = h2(0, 0) = u2(0, 0), and (0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium.
8.6 Proof of Theorem 7
The proof of Theorem 7 will be based on the selection lemma below. Given y = (yi)i∈N ∈ RN and
y′ = (y′i)i∈N ∈ RN , define y ∨ y′ = (max{yi, y′i})i∈N ∈ RN . A multivalued mapping Ψ from X to RN is
called ∨-stable if y ∨ y′ ∈ Ψ(x) whenever x ∈ X and (y, y′) ∈ Ψ(x)×Ψ(x).
Lemma 20 Let X be a compact subset of a topological vector space. Let Ψ be a ∨-stable multivalued
mapping from X to RN such that for every x ∈ RN , there exists a neighborhood V of x such that
∩x′∈V Ψ(x′) 6= ∅. Then Ψ admits a selection ψ = (ψi)i∈N such that for every i ∈ N and every α ∈ RN ,
the set {x ∈ X : ∀i ∈ N, ψi(x) ≤ αi} is open in X.
Proof. For every x ∈ X, let V (x) be a compact13 neighborhood of x such that ∩x′∈V (x)Ψ(x′) 6=
∅, and choose y(x) ∈ ∩x′∈V (x)Ψ(x′). Since X is compact, there exist some compact neighborhoods
13 Without any loss of generality, since X admits a compact basis of neighborhoods at every x ∈ X, taking a smaller
neighborhood if necessary, we can assume V (x) compact.
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V (x1), ..., V (xn) of x1, ..., xn, whose interiors cover X. For every x ∈ X, define
ψ(x) = ∨k:x∈V (xk)y(xk). (20)
Since Ψ is ∨-stable, the mapping ψ : X → RN is a selection of Ψ. Now, we claim that for every i ∈ N
and every α ∈ RN , the set
Y := {x ∈ X : ∀i ∈ N, ψi(x) ≤ αi} (21)
is an open subset of X. For every x¯ ∈ Y , it suffices to prove that
V := (∪k:x¯∈V (xk)V (xk)) ∩ (∩k′:x¯/∈V (xk′ )cV (xk′)) (22)
is a neighborhood of x¯, and is included in Y .
First, V is clearly a neighborhood of x¯ in X: indeed, x¯ belongs the interior of some V (xk) (since
the interiors of V (x1), ..., V (xn) cover X), thus ∪k:x¯∈V (xk)V (xk) is a neighborhood of x¯. Moreover,
∩k′:x¯/∈V (xk′ )cV (xk′) is a finite intersection of (open) neighborhoods of x¯.
Second, fix y ∈ V , and prove y ∈ Y , i.e. ψi(y) ≤ αi for every i ∈ I. From the definition of ψi (Equa-
tion 20), this can be written equivalently: for every i ∈ I, for every k such that y ∈ V (xk), yi(xk) ≤ αi.
To prove this last inequality, fix i ∈ I and k such that y ∈ V (xk): the definition of V , ψ(x¯) and Y gives
x¯ ∈ V (xk), yi(xk) ≤ ψi(x¯) and ψi(x¯) ≤ αi, so that yi(xk) ≤ αi.
Now, we prove Theorem 7 by contradiction: assumeG has no tight equilibrium. Define the multivalued
mapping Ψ from X to RN as follows (where N (x) denotes the set of open neighborhoods of x ∈ X): for
every strategy profile x ∈ X,
Ψ(x) = {α ∈ RN : ∃V ∈ N (x), ∃(Φi)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NWV (x−i) : (1) inf
(d′i,x
′
−i)∈GrΦi
uΦii (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≥ αi
(2) ∀z ∈ V, ∃i0 : αi0 > ui0(z)}.
We now check that Lemma 20 can be applied to Ψ.
Step 1: Ψ has non-empty values: indeed, by assumption, there is no tight equilibrium: given x ∈ X, it
follows that there exists a neighborhood V of x (which can be assumed to be compact) and (Φi)i∈N in
Πi∈NWV (x−i) such that for every z ∈ V , there exists i0 ∈ N such that:
∀(d′i0 , x′−i0) ∈ GrΦi0 , u
Φi0
i0
(d′i0 , x
′
−i0) > ui0(z). (23)
For every i ∈ N , define αi = inf(d′i,x′−i)∈GrΦi uΦii (d′i, x′−i), so that Condition (1) in the definition of
Ψ(x) is satisfied. Furthermore, since the restriction of uΦi to the compact set {(d′i, x′−i) ∈ Xi × V−i : d′i ∈
Φi(x
′
−i)} is lower semicontinuous, αi = uΦii (d′i, x′−i) for some (d′i, x′−i) ∈ GrΦi. Consequently, for every
z ∈ V , Inequality 23 implies αi0 > ui0(z) for some i0 ∈ N , i.e. Condition (2) is also satisfied.
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Step 2: Ψ is a ∨-stable multivalued mapping: take x ∈ X, α and α′ in Ψ(x). From the definition
of Ψ(x), there exists V ∈ N (x) (resp. V ′ ∈ N (x)), and there exists (Φi)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NWV (x−i) (resp.
(Φ′i)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NWV ′(x−i)), both satisfying:
inf
(d′i,x
′
−i)∈GrΦi
uΦii (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≥ αi (24)
∀z ∈ V, ∃i0 : αi0 > ui0(z) (25)
inf
(d′i,x
′
−i)∈GrΦ′i
u
Φ′i
i (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≥ α′i (26)
∀z ∈ V ′, ∃i0 : α′i0 > ui0(z) (27)
For every i ∈ N , define Φ′′i ∈ WV (x−i) as follows: Φ′′i (x) = Φi(x) if αi ≥ α′i and Φ′′i (x) = Φ′i(x)
otherwise. Define V ′′ = V ′∩V and α′′ = α∨α′. To prove that α′′ ∈ Ψ(x), prove that Φ′′ and V ′′ satisfies
the two conditions in the definition of α′′ ∈ Ψ(x). First, Inequation 25 and Inequation 27 gives: for every
z ∈ V ′′, there exists i0 such that α′′i0 > ui0(z), which proves Condition (2). Second, given i ∈ N , the case
αi ≥ α′i implies
inf
(d′i,x
′
−i)∈GrΦ′′i
u
Φ′′i
i (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≥ inf
(d′i,x
′
−i)∈GrΦi
uΦii (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≥ αi = α′′i ,
the case αi < α
′
i being similar. This proves Condition (1). Finally, α
′′ = α ∨ α′ ∈ Ψ(x), i.e. Ψ is a
∨-stable multivalued mapping.
Step 3 : Ψ has open pre-images: it is immediate from the definition of Ψ.
From Lemma 20, we get a selection α : X → RN of Ψ, which satisfies the openness condition of
Lemma 20. To finish the proof of Theorem 7, we apply a fixed-point theorem a` la Kakutani [20] to the
following multivalued mapping Ψ′. Define, for every x ∈ X:
Ψ′(x) = co{d ∈ X : ∃V ∈ N (x) and (Φi)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NWV (x−i)
such that for every i ∈ N, (di)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NΦi(x−i) and inf
(d′i,x
′
−i)∈GrΦi
uΦii (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≥ sup
x′′∈V
αi(x
′′)}.
First check that for every x ∈ X, there exists some local selection of Ψ′ with non-empty, compact,
convex values and which has a closed graph. The definition of α gives V ∈ N (x) and Φ = (Φi)i∈N ∈
Πi∈NWV (x−i) such that for every i ∈ N , the following inequality is true: inf(d′i,x′−i)∈GrΦi uΦii (d′i, x′−i) ≥
αi(x). But α has been chosen so that the set {x ∈ X : inf(d′i,x′−i)∈GrΦi uΦii (d′i, x′−i)) ≥ αi(x)} is open,
consequently Πi∈NΦi(x−i) ⊂ Ψ′(x) (taking V smaller if necessary), and Πi∈NΦi(x−i) is the local selection
of Ψ′ we are looking for. Second, Ψ′ has convex images by definition.
Consequently, we can apply the following generalization of Kakutani’s theorem to Ψ′. A multivalued
mapping F from X to X is called Kakutani if it has non-empty, compact, convex values and has a closed
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graph.
Theorem 21 Let X be a compact subspace of a topological vector space which is locally convex and
Hausdorff . Let F from X to X, with convex values, and such that for every x ∈ X, there exists a local
multivalued selection G of F around x. Then F admits a fixed point.
Proof. From the compactness of X, there exists a finite subset {x1, ..., xK} of X, and for every
k = 1, ...,K, there exists Gk a Kakutani multivalued selection of F from some neighborhood Vxk of
xk to X, where Vx1 , ..., VxK is a finite covering of X. Let β1, ..., βK a partition of unit subordinate to
the covering Vx1 , ..., VxK . Thus, each βk is a continuous function from X in [0, 1], with support in Vxk ,
such that for every x ∈ X, ∑Kk=1 βk(x) = 1. Define G(x) = ∑Kk=1 βk(x)Gk(x). It is clearly a Kakutani
multivalued selection of F (because F has convex values). From Kakutani’s Theorem, it admits a fixed
point, which is a fixed point of F .
Applying the fixed-point theorem above, Ψ′ admits a fixed point x¯ ∈ X. This means that there
exists d(1), ..., d(K) in X and some non-negative real numbers λ(1), ..., λ(K) with
∑K
k=1 λ(k) = 1 and
x¯ =
K∑
k=1
λ(k)d(k), and such that for every k = 1, ...,K, there is some V ∈ N (x) and some (Φi)i∈N ∈
Πi∈NWV (x−i) such that ui(di(k), x¯−i) ≥ uΦii (di(k), x¯−i) ≥ αi(x¯) (the first inequality being a consequence
of the definition of uΦii ). Recall that the mapping ui(., x¯−i) is quasi concave. Consequently, from the above
inequalities for every k = 1, ...,K, we obtain ui(x¯) ≥ αi(x¯) for every i ∈ N , which yields a contradiction
with Condition (2) in the definition of Ψ, i.e. the fact that for every z in some neighborhood V ′ of x¯,
there exists i0 ∈ N such that αi0(x¯) > ui0(z).
8.7 Kakutani regularity requirement in Barelli-Soza equilibrium
Observe that (x, v) ∈ Γ is a Barelli-Soza equilibrium if and only if, for every i:
sup
V ∈V(x−i)
sup
Φi∈WV
inf
(di,x′−i)∈GrΦi
ui(di, x
′
−i) ≤ vi,
where WV is the set of Kakutani mappings from V to Xi. The following lemma prove that a Barelli-Soza
equilibrium may not exist if WV is replaced by ΩV , the set of multi-valued mapping from V to Xi:
Lemma 22 In a zero-sum game, there exists (x, v) ∈ Γ such that
sup
V ∈V(x−i)
sup
Φi∈ΩV
inf
(di,x′−i)∈GrΦi
ui(di, x
′
−i) ≤ vi (28)
if and only if the game has a value.
Consequently, since there are quasiconcave games in pure or mixed strategies without a value, a
Barelli-Soza equilibrium may not exist without the regularity requirement on Φi. To prove the lemma,
first prove
sup
V ∈V(x−i)
sup
Φi∈ΩV
inf
(di,x′−i)∈GrΦi
ui(di, x
′
−i) = sup
V ∈V(x−i)
inf
x′−i∈V
sup
di∈Xi
ui(di, x
′
−i).
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Let βi = sup
Φi∈ΩV
inf
(di,x′−i)∈GrΦi
ui(di, x
′
−i) and αi = inf
x′−i∈V
sup
di∈Xi
ui(di, x
′
−i). For every x
′
−i ∈ X−i, take
Φi(x
′
−i) ∈ {di ∈ Xi : ui(di, x′−i) ≥ supdi∈Xi ui(di, x′−i) − ε} in the supremum defining βi: it gives
βi ≥ αi − ε. The converse inequality βi ≤ αi is straightforward, and proves the equality above.
Now, let S (resp. T ) denote the compact set of strategies of player 1 (resp. 2) and let f = u1 = −u2
be a bounded payoff function. Let ((s, t), (v,−v)) ∈ Γ satisfy Equation 28, i.e.
sup
V ∈V(t)
inf
t′∈V
sup
s∈S
f(s, t′) ≤ v
and
inf
V ∈V(s)
sup
s′∈V
inf
t∈T
f(s′, t) ≥ v.
Taking V = T in the first supremum and V = S in the second one, we obtain:
inf
t′∈T
sup
s′∈S
f(s′, t′) ≤ v ≤ sup
s′∈S
inf
t′∈T
f(s′, t′),
that is, the game has a value. The converse is straighforward.
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